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Title: Crimean Movements (1855)
Description: Leading article by Engels on d'Allonville's reconnaissance from Eupatoria toward Sympheropol and the close of the 1855 campaign in the Crimea.
Author: Friedrich Engels
Date: 1855-11-28
URL: https://marxismo.school/archivo/marx-engels/originales/1855%20Crimean%20Movements
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*Published without signature as a leading article in the* New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 4558, November 28, 1855, p. 4; attributed to Friedrich Engels by MEGA² (I/14). A vertical strip of the page is damaged at the right edge of the third column: the lost letters are supplied in square brackets. Text after the original print of the newspaper (Library of Congress, Chronicling America). [Traducción al español](https://marxismo.school/archivo/marx-engels/1855%20Movimientos%20en%20Crimea)*

According to our last advices from the Crimea there is little reason to expect any very important war intelligence by the Atlantic due here to-day or to-morrow. Indeed, the indications are rather that so far as great movements are concerned the campaign is closed for the Autumn, unless fine weather to a degree quite unusual for the season in that country should afford an opportunity for prolonging the operations. What is most probable in such a case is, that Gorchakoff may undertake a demonstration upon Eupatoria, though, as we have shown in a recent examination of the subject, his chances of success are exceedingly exiguous. On the part of the Allies, not only the general tardiness of their movements since the fall of South Sevastopol but the fact that the strong reconnoissances they have lately undertaken on the Upper Belbek on the one hand, and from Eupatoria toward Sympheropol on the other have both produced no positive results also shows that they are not inclined to attempt further fighting for the present. Of the first of these reconnoissances we have already given our readers a careful account, and we now proceed to complete our record of the campaign by describing the second.

It seems that Gen. d'Allonville marched with 24 battalions of infantry, [3]8 squadrons of cavalry, and 56 guns—in all about 25,000 men—toward Sak, on the road to Sympheropol. About four miles beyond Sak the road, running north-west to south-east, crosses the ravine of Chobotar. This is the first of a series of ravines, watered in the wet season by small rivers, which between Eupatoria and Sevastopol run generally due east and west from the interior toward the sea. These ravines form important military positions, as the Alma, the Belbek and the Chernaya have already proved. The ravine of Chobotar, though less important in its general features, has this peculiarity, that it closes the direct road from Eupatoria to Sympheropol. As in the Crimea no long marches across the country can be undertaken, and the few military roads must generally be followed, the defiles of Chobotar offer a capital position for barring the access to Sympheropol. Accordingly, the Russians have entrenched it and armed their redoubts with 36 long thirty-two-pounders, whose extensive range the French experienced as soon as they approached the position. There was a numerous body of Russian infantry in and behind the entrenchments, and Gen. d'Allonville did not venture a front attack. He maneuvered wi[th h]is cavalry toward his left so as to threaten to [tu]rn the Russians by the head of the ravine, [a fe]w miles higher up. But the Russians did not [sti]r, and his cavalry, on advancing further inland, [it a]ppears from the Russian report to have met [wi]th strong bodies of Russian horse maneuvering [up]on its flank, so as to prevent it from penetrating [to]o far. This maneuvering lasted about a day an[d a] half, when d'Allonville, seeing no possibility [o]f doing any good, retreated toward Eupatoria, un[de]r the pretext of a scarcity of water.

There is however another road, of an infer[ior] description it is true, but not intersect[ed] by any military obstacle of importance, wh[ich] runs a little north of Sak toward the ro[ad] from Perekop to Sympheropol, leaving the first mentioned high-road about six or eight miles to t[he] south. This road the Russians appear to hold [b]y cavalry only. If it were possible to gain the hig[h-]road from Perekop by this route, the post at C[ho]botar would be useless to the Russians, the same object would be attained the communication wi[th] Perekop being cut off and even that with Chong[ar] menaced. In such a case, the Russians would b[e] obliged to send strong forces against the corps fro[m] Eupatoria; but this corps would always have a safe retreat either north or south of Lake Sasik, unless provided with an insufficient force of cavalry and acting incautiously. After the Eupatoria corps had retreated, the Russian reënforcements would very likely march back, particularly if Pelissier, as would be his duty, had made their absence the signal of some threatening maneuvers. As soon as they had commenced their return, the Eupatoria corps might again advance, and thus this harrassing game, by which the Russians would be sure to suffer most, might be played until either a fit of impatience or a mistake on the part of the Russians opened a fair opportunity for a decisive blow. In this way Napoleon was harrassed by the allied armies in 1813, in his central position at Dresden, until his strength had suffered by repeated defeats of single corps, and the superiority gained by his opponents justified the concentric attack on Leipzic. The season is now, as we have said, too far advanced to carry out such a plan of campaign; but why it was not done as soon as Sevastopol was taken, it is difficult to understand.

General d'Allonville has indeed made some overtures toward a movement on this road; but he seems too weak, especially in cavalry, to go far from his base of operations. At least this is the best explanation for the extreme caution of his movements. Eighteen thousand infantry and five thousand cavalry are not enough for the purpose. He should have had double these numbers, and above all more than one solitary division of French infantry; for it must not be forgotten that among the disposable force under his command there are but nine battalions and twelve squadrons of French soldiers, with some ten squadrons of English; the rest, sixteen battalions and sixteen squadrons, consist of Turks, whose aptness for field-service has not yet been tried. At all events, the lateness of the season all but precludes every chance of his gaining important advantages in this direction; and if we are to judge from last year's experience, we shall probably soon hear of the troops going into their Winter quarters.