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Title: The War in Asia (November 20, 1855) (1855)
Description: Leading article by Engels on Omer Pasha’s landing in Mingrelia and his passage of the Ingour: the march on Tiflis as the first correct strategical move of the war, and the danger of a Turkish slave trade in Christian Georgia.
Author: Friedrich Engels
Date: 1855-12-07
URL: https://marxismo.school/archivo/marx-engels/originales/1855%20The%20War%20in%20Asia%20%28November%2020%2C%201855%29
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*Published without signature as a leading article in the* New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 4566, December 7, 1855, p. 4; attributed to Friedrich Engels by MEGA² (I/14); dated November 20, 1855, by MEGA². One line of the print is incomplete (“and of th[…]”). Text after the original print of the newspaper (Library of Congress, Chronicling America). [Traducción al español](https://marxismo.school/archivo/marx-engels/1855%20La%20guerra%20en%20Asia%20%2820%20de%20noviembre%20de%201855%29)*

The arrival of the steamer St. Louis at this port yesterday morning, preceding by a few hours the mail of the America which reached us last night at midnight, puts us in possession of documents that render it possible to form a judgment upon Omer Pasha's recent brilliant exploit at the River Ingour, where he forced a passage in face of the enemy. Our readers have already been informed of the fact that after landing part of his troops at Batoum, the Turkish general had singled out the valley of the river Rioni for his line of operations. This determination was manifested by the transfer of his base of operations from Batoum to Sukum-Kaleh. The Rioni flows into the Black Sea about half way between these two towns; and as there is no harbor on the intervening coast, Omer Pasha was obliged to choose between the two, if he intended to march up the Rioni. There are no very practicable roads between Batoum and the plain of that river, while from Sukum-Kaleh not only the Russian military road along the coast to Redot-Kaleh, and thence up the river, the Tiflis high road was available, but also a cross-road which leaves the coast at Shemsherrai, near the fort and town of Ilori, and joins the Tiflis road near Khopi, about nine miles above Redut-Kaleh. It appears that these reasons decided Omer Pasha's choice, and made him prefer Sukum-Kaleh.

Ilori is the frontier town between Abkasia and Mingrelia—the former a narrow strip of mountain land formed by the steep slopes of the Caucasus toward the sea—the latter partly a similar mountain country in the southern slope of the Caucasus, but partly, too, a rich alluvial plain formed by the deposits of the Caucasian rivers between the mountains and the sea. Of these rivers there are but two of any importance—the Ingour, whose valley forms Mingrelia, and the Rioni, whose valley is called Imeretia. Imeretia, the larger and southernmost of the two provinces, is bordered by the Caucasus to the north, and by the highlands connecting that range with the Armenian group to the east. Across these highlands runs the road into Georgia, straight to Tiflis.

Thus, the first object for Omer Pasha to accomplish was the conquest of the valleys of the Ingour and Rioni—in other words, of the provinces of Mingrelia and Imeretia. This accomplished, his land communication with Batoum and Asiatic Turkey would be restored so as to leave him the choice of retreat, in case of necessity, either toward Batoum or Sukum-Kaleh. At the same time, considerable mountains, passable at certain points only, would protect him against any sudden attack; in fact, he might consider himself as occupying the salient angle of a vast bastion, one face of which, formed by the Caucasus, is completely impregnable; while the other, formed by the Armenian and Georgian mountains, is assailable at two or three points only. In the present state of affairs, if once established in this bastion, he might consider himself safe against any eventuality. At the same time, this position was sure to rouse to active hostilities against Russia the tribes of the northern slope of the Caucasus, in Ossetia and the Kabardas, while it was a constant and direct menace against Tiflis and Akalzik. And if the time during which Kars could hold out against the Russian blockade was correctly calculated, this maneuver of Omer Pasha's would indeed be the very first correct and great strategical move made during all this war. Tiflis being the center of Russian resistance, the chief Russian base of operations south of the Caucasus, a march on Tiflis is the simplest and most decisive move not only to relieve Kars, but to force the Russians to abandon the greater part of Transcaucasia for the protection of this single town. Tiflis once attacked by a sufficient force and taken, the whole of Transcaucasia would be lost to Russia, the remnant of the army there would be without retreat except by the Caspian Sea, and the military and political limit to Russian power would at once recoil, from Akalzik and Erivan to Rostoff and Stavropol, from the Araxes to the Kuban and Terek. Russia would be reduced, on this side, to her frontier of 1782, and the fruits of seventy years' labor would be lost.

Now, it is not to be expected that such can be the result of Omer Pasha's operations, at least for this season. A march on Tiflis would require at least 40,000 men, as it would be met by the concentration of all the Russian forces in Transcaucasia; and while the Turkish army of Erzeroum and Kars would have enough to do to follow up the Russians on its own side, the occupation of Imeretia and Mingrelia would require 20,000 men more. Omer Pasha would then require about 60,000 men in all, independent of the army of Erzeroum; and such an army he is very far from having at present. But what Omer Pasha may accomplish before Winter is the conquest of Mingrelia and Imeretia, of that mountain bastion which will secure him comfortable and safe quarters till Spring, and the occupation of which must at all events oblige the Russians about Kars and Gumri to fall back toward Tiflis before Winter has made the Armenian table-land impracticable.

As far as our news go, Omer Pasha had collected about 25,000 men at Sukum-Kaleh, with the greater portion of which he marched down the coast to Ilori, and then took the cross road toward Khopi. This road crosses several mountain streams, the passage of most of which might be disputed, but none of which is of such importance as the Ingour. It was behind this river, consequently, that the Russians had taken up a defensive position. Their number is stated in various dispatches to have amounted to 6,000, 10,000, or 16,000; the total of 10,000, however, agrees best with what information we received previously, and appears the most likely of all. The Russians, cut off from the coast and occupying a province scarcely defensible against attacks coming from the sea, might concentrate in it some 15,000 men, for the greater part Transcausian Christian militia, but scarcely more; and of th[…] more than 10,000 could have been spared for the defense of the Ingour. Thus, not only were the Russians evidently outnumbered by the Turks, (whatever exaggerated dispatches may say to the contrary,) but the quality of the Russian troops was not much to boast of. Of the troops of the line employed south of the Caucasus, all but one brigade of the 13th division of infantry and one brigade of the 21st division were engaged at Kars, unless indeed the 19th and 20th divisions had been brought across from their positions on the northern slope of the Caucasus, which is not likely. What other troops the Russians have south of that range consist of Georgian militia battalions, troops of no great value, and it was evidently a body composed principally of such which opposed the Turks on the Ingour.

Of the tactical merits of the battle we have as yet no means of judging. Neither the natural strength of the position, nor the extent and importance of the intrenchments covering the Russian front are known. We cannot tell whether the position could be easily turned, nor whether it actually was turned. All we know is that the river Ingour was low enough to enable Omer Pasha to ford it in four places by as many columns; that these columns attacked the Russian position and carried it after a five hours' combat. The encounter has this interesting feature, that it is the first battle in this war in which the Turks have attacked intrenched lines, and, to their credit, they carried them. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the position, being just at the head of the delta of the Ingour, not more than ten miles from the sea and twenty from Redout-Kaleh, would indeed appear liable enough to be turned on its left; and that the Russians, in case a serious flanking maneuver had been attempted, would have been perfectly justified in using the right of the weaker party and retreating. Anyhow, the details of this action will be received with uncommon interest as they will show us how the Turkish army acted under circumstances completely new to its previous military traditions and habits; and as far as Omer Pasha is concerned, the operations entered upon will have an equally great interest, inasmuch as they will, for the first time, give us an opportunity of judging of him as a commander in the field.

That the battle of the Ingour will decide the conquest of Mingrelia and Imeretia would be more than can be expected. A number of smaller mountain-torrents run down, parallel to the Ingour, from the Caucasian ridge; one or two are not unimportant, and every one offers a position for rear-guard demonstrations so as to retard pursuit, and to allow the beaten army a chance of re-forming At Kutais, at least, the Rioni itself offers a serious barrier; and if Omer Pasha could bring 20,000 men to the Ingour, he can hardly appear with more than 14,000 here, unless fresh reënforcements are landed. Thus at Kutais, the forces of both parties with their present strength, would be about balanced; and the ability of bringing up reënforcements would decide the possession of Upper Imeretia. The battle of the Ingour took place on the 6th, (some dispatches say 5th,) of November: by the end of that month the season for active operations in that country would cease; we shall, therefore, soon learn what fruits the action has born to the Turks.

There is another point of high importance, which has been noticed by some correspondents of the British press. The inhabitants of Mingrelia and Imeretia are Christians in great part—those of Georgia almost exclusively so. They had to carry on a continuous war against both Circassians and Turks up to the time the Russians took possession of the country; and the object of this war was to prevent their Mohammedan neighbors from carrying off the young men and women of the country to be sold into slavery at Constantinople. Nay, in the beginning of this campaign, as soon as the Russians had abandoned the coast and many posts in the interior in order to concentrate their troops, the Circassians, and even the Turks at Redout-Kaleh, recommenced their slave-catching excursions, and thereby all at once exasperated the Christian populations. To secure, therefore, at least the indifference of the Georgians, a division of French or English troops should be added to Omer Pasha's army; for, whatever his own views of the case may be, his officers and soldiers will be sure to relapse into a traffic so congenial to their habits and so lucrative to themselves. This is an occurrence the Allies should try, by all means, to prevent; and until European forces are sent to Georgia to protect the Christians of that country, every step in advance of Turkish troops alone will but serve to rivet their allegiance to Russia faster and faster.