The Asiatic Campaign (1855)

Published without signature as a leading article in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4585, December 29, 1855, p. 4; attributed to Friedrich Engels by MEGA² (I/14). Text after the original print of the newspaper (Library of Congress, Chronicling America). Traducción al español

As soon as Omer Pasha, by establishing his headquarters at Sukam-Kaleh, had clearly indicated what plan of campaign he was going to follow, we said that his movement upon Tiflis, the Russian main base of operations, was the first movement in this war which had a distinct strategical character, by leaving all minor points out of consideration, and directing itself straight at the fountain-head of all Russian power south of the Caucasus. That is its merit; but in order to relieve Kars, its decisive effects must develop themselves within the period that Kars would be able to hold out; and that, again, must depend entirely upon the state of provisions at Kars, of which we had but little knowledge.

Thus it was that we expressed ourselves upon this subject, at the time the British press, overjoyed at being able to recount a maneuver based upon a correct strategical idea, were busy informing the public that no better or safer plan could have been found to relieve Kars than this movement; that to march from Batoum upon Kars would have been to give the Russians the certainty of a safe retreat; but that Omer Pasha, by marching straight on Tiflis, had made sure of capturing alive General Muravieff, all his army, and every other Russian who might still be south of the Caucasus. For, indeed, would not Muravieff abandon the siege of Kars and return by forced marches to Tiflis as soon as he should hear of this daring maneuver? And who, of course, was to have the credit of this ingenious and bold march, but Col. Siammonds and the remainder of the British officers at Omer Pasha's headquarters, and consequently above all, John Bull, whom they represented.

However, in spite of the strategy of the British newspapers, Muravieff did raise the blockade of Kars, for siege there was none. On the contrary, he made every preparation to pass the Winter before the town, never minding the operations of Omer Pasha in Mingrelia and the terrible English Napoleons of his staff. And that he was perfectly justified in doing so, we showed a few days since by our approximative statement of the forces at the disposal of Prince Bebutoff, the commander in Georgia and Mingrelia. A General having at his disposal two Russian divisions of the line, at least one of the reserve, and from twenty to thirty battalions of militia, has no reason of Omer Pasha being able to endanger Tiflis with an army numbering at the outset but 30,000 to 40,000 Turks; and Gen. Muravieff might well be tranquil in his camp before Kars. From that moment, then, the fate of Kars was decided, unless the weather should drive off the blockading army; or relief should come from Erzeroum. Now, as to the first, the underground huts constructed by the Russians were proof that they intended to risk the chances of the weather; and as to the second eventuality, Selim Pasha at Erzeroum never could concentrate more than some 6,000 regular and 5,000 irregular troops, with which body he would never have had the courage to undertake even a reconnoisance. The Russians, too intent to insulate Kars from all chances of supply, did not venture to establish themselves west of the Soghanly Dagh, (a range of hills separating the Valley of the Kars Chai from that of the Araxes,) except by the detachment advancing from the Valley of the Murad Chai to Deli Baba. The British officers at Erzeroum, seeing that this detachment was posted some thirty miles in advance of the Russian position at the Soghanly Dagh, and badly connected with it, proposed to attack it; and as this detachment could not muster more than 1,000 men, with perhaps 2,500 more in reserve, the matter was feasible enough. But Selim Pasha would not do anything of the kind. No move was made, and the convoys of provisions collected at Erzeroum, and destined ostensibly for Kars, were not even sent off. Thus, it was but a question of provisions. As soon as the supply should fail at Kars the town would have to surrender; and this is said to have taken place. The garrison had for a long time been on short rations—first one half, afterward one third of the normal daily quantity of food; at last everything was exhausted. Under these circumstances the capitulation of the town appears at least very probable. Gen. Kmetty (Ismail Pasha) with a few officers is reported to have made his way through the Russian lines—how, is not yet explained—and brought the news to Erzerom that the commander had sent a flag of truce to Muravieff to treat for a capitulation. Authentic news on the subject, however, we have not yet received.

The defense of the place deserves great credit. Not only did the garrison, though charged with the defense of extended and faultily-constructed lines, cheerfully stand by its arms, day and night, and when the assault came, repelled it with glory; it also endured the pangs of hunger with an obstinacy worthy the greatest praise. On the other hand, Gen. Muravieff deserves equal credit for his tenacity of purpose. After the attack of Sept. 29, ending so disastrously for the Russians, their retreat from Kars was expected on all hands. But, instead of retreating, Muravieff re-established the blockade far more severely than before, sent away his unnecessary baggage, and made himself and his army at home all around the town. Three enemies menaced him, the strength of none of which he could easily calculate with any degree of accuracy. Selim Pasha at Erzerom, Omer Pasha in Mingrelia, and the Winter of the Arsunian Hills. But he appears to have kept steadily before his eyes the real state of the case. The danger from Selim Pasha's, as well as from Omer Pasha's armies was distant and uncertain, while the fall of Kars was near and certain, if the blockade could only be kept up. He was, therefore, perfectly right to disregard his military enemies. As to the effects of Winter, his army, three times as strong as the garrison of Kars, was sure, under all circumstances, of a safe retreat to Gumri, (Alexandropol) its main depot, and one of the strongest fortresses in Russia. Gumri is but forty miles from Kars, and whatever harm the climate might do the Russians, it could never prevent them from regaining this fortress where they would find everything they required, besides, perfect security from all attacks. Thus Muravieff's resolution to see the end of the blockade of Kars was perfectly justified.

The loss of Kars is not of any immediate strategical importance to the Turks. The season is too far advanced for further active operations on the Armenian highlands. The possession of Kars secures to the Russians it is true, a strip of land forty miles broad by a hundred long; but this strip has been virtually in their possession for more than a year. To them it is most important that their immediate base of operations is thereby advanced forty miles and their next line of attack pushed from the Kars Chai to the Araxes. What they will make of this advantage depends upon the circumstances under which next Spring's campaign is opened. And there is no possibility of foretelling them. The fall of Kars suggests the question whether Omer Pasha was justified in undertaking his eccentric operation in Mingrelia—eccentric with regard to the menaced points of Turkey in Asia, when Kars was so hard pressed.

Omer Pasha concentrated his army at Sukum-Kaleh from the middle of September to the middle of October. It was not till about the 15th or 20th of October that he was in a position to advance. If he had made Batoum his maritime base of operations, he could not have advanced a day sooner. Now, he had to decide upon his course during the last half of September, whe Kars was hard pressed, and a regular siege expected, and before Muravieff made his assault. What was he to do?—to take the only regular army Turkey still possessed, to march it by either Ardahan or Olti upon Kars, a march into the interior of some 180 or 200 miles with no other object but to relieve a place which might fall long before he could reach it? And supposing Kars had fallen, what was he to do with his troops then?—to retire to Erzeroum and spend his days in squabbles for precedence with Selim Pasha, who is Mushir or Field-Marshal of equal rank with himself? Certainly not. Far better to leave Kars to its fate and advance on a line which in the long run must certainly menace Russian power in Transcaucasia more than any other. Tiflis, after all, is the heart of that Power, and the shortest road to Tiflis is that from Redut-Kaleh by Kutais and Gori.

So far so good. But now comes the execution, and here we recognise at every step our old friend Fabius Curctator, Omer Pasha. Slow and sure is his motto, although he has scarcely any respectable hostile forces in his immediate neighbrohood. He is an Austrian, and he recollects the old German popular song: “Jog on quietly, my boys, jog on slowly so that the Austrian militia can keep pace with you.” In accordance with this principle, we find that his semi-official chronicler, Mr. L. Oliphant, now of The Times, informs us in the very first sentence of his last letter, dated Sugdidi, Nov. 11: “The day after a battle is generally a day of rest.” Generally! What would old Napoleon or even Blucher have said to this new strategical rule? To judge from this new principle, there never were such blunders made as Napoleon's pursuit of the Prussians in 1806, from Jena to Stettin, or the one in which Blucher repaid him, from Waterloo to Paris. But we manage things better in the Caucasus. Pursuit is nonsense. Two days we rest, and during the following three we advance fully fifteen miles to Sugdid. At that rate, with good luck, we may be in Kutais sometime in January, which is near forty miles further on.