Published unsigned as a leading article, under the headline “The Crimean Campaign”, in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4575, December 18, 1855, p. 4; attributed to Friedrich Engels by MEGA² (I/14), which dates it November 30, 1855. Text from the original newspaper (Library of Congress, Chronicling America). Traducción al español.
According to all our advices by the last steamer the relative positions of the Allied and Russian armies in the Crimea remain unchanged. Nothing had occurred on the Chernaya, where indeed the Allies, in spite of their boasted superiority, appear to be more afraid of a hostile attack than the Russians. Desultory firing still went on across the Bay of Sevastopol with no other result than to prevent the Allies from taking up quarters in the half ruined town and to enforce greater caution upon their working parties in the city. At Kertch some skirmishing had taken place, but without the slightest importance. At Eupatoria, the Turkish cavalry, under Ali Pasha, accompanied by four Anglo-French squadrons, and supported by strong reserves on its flank and rear, had carried out a successful surprise against the village of Chotai, fifteen miles further north, and captured about three thousand animals, principally sheep, collected there by the Russians. No other warlike events had taken place; on the contrary, the return of the division of French guards to France, whither it is to be followed by another division, with the gradual transfer of all the cavalry, both French and English, from Sevastopol to the Bosphorus looks as if all idea of any offensive advance toward Mackenzie, and the Upper Belbek had been abandoned for this season. The guards have been replaced, it is true, by the freshly arrived division under Chasseloup-Laubat, but had Marshal Pelissier intended an attack, the presence of an extra division, while the Guards were still there, would have offered him a chance which he certainly would not have lost. In the same manner the British fresh arrivals—a German and a Swiss brigade, with the large drafts from the depots of regiments whose service battalions are in the Crimea, and several regiments from the Mediterranean stations—are being concentrated at Malta, Scutari and Smyrna. Thus the campaign may be said to be over so far as the allied commanders at Sevastopol are concerned; but these gentlemen do not appear to be convinced that it is over for the Russians also. Up to the latest dates the fear of a Russian night attack, a repetition of Inkerman and Traktir was so lively at headquarters that an intended expedition to Kaffa had been put off. Gen. Spencer’s brigade, returned from Kinburn and destined to form part of this expedition, was retained on account of this expected Russian attack; but with a wisdom peculiar, as it seems, to British commanders, it was kept on board ship at Kamiesh, so that in case the attack should happen, it might be as useless as if it had been sent to Kaffa.
This latter expedition would certainly have been accompanied by important results, if undertaken with sufficient force. Kaffa is no more defensible on the seaside than Kertch was, if indeed it is not less so. There is no more doubt that the allied fleet can take Kaffa than that the allied troops can hold it when once established there. Kaffa once taken, the troops at Kertch, now reënforced by 15,000 men of the Anglo-Turkish contingent, would be in a position to advance with safety; for all the troops which Gen. Wrangel, who commands the Russians there, may have in the peninsula of Kertch, (between that town, Kaffa and Arabat), would have to withdraw or be cut off. Now, while the allied fleets can sail in a single night from Kamiesh and Balaklava to Kaffa, the Russians have seventy miles to march from their nearest point, Sympheropol—say fully three days’ march—through a difficult country, and at least another day must pass before the troops intended for the relief of Kaffa could receive the necessary orders. Thus the Allies would have four clear days’ start, if the secret were kept, and if nothing but the course of the steamers, when once under weigh, betrayed their intention. In such a case, it is scarcely to be doubted that Gen. Wrangel must suffer a defeat before his supports could come up, and that this defeat would decide the fate of the little fort of Arabat also. But with Kaffa, Arabat and Kertch, the whole of the peninsula of Kertch would belong to the Allies, and a new base of operations would be gained, as important in many respects as that at Eupatoria. Before the campaign on the Chernaya and the Upper Belbek was over, there was this to be said against such an expedition, that it would have taken a valuable force away for a minor object, from the place where it was most wanted; but the defensive on the Chernaya being once resolved upon, this reason entirely disappears.
The Russians have now in the Crimea fourteen divisions of regular infantry (two of the grenadiers, three of the second, three of the third, two of the fourth, two of the fifth, two of the sixth army-corps), forming a grand total, at the very outside, of 125,000 infantry. To these we must add some 20,000 militia, by this time probably incorporated with the line, a body of cavalry certainly not above 15,000 men, and say 15,000 artillery and sappers—in all say 165,000 to 175,000 men. The Allies now have in the Crimea, in all, about 150,000 infantry, 14,000 artillery, and a force of cavalry diminishing every day by the transfer of this arm to the Bosphorus, but which, during the Winter, may average 9,000, including Bashi-Bazouks—in all say 170,000 men. Thus, the forces on both sides appear pretty equal in numbers, but the Russians have the central position, and may therefore at any time concentrate the main body of their troops toward any given point, while the Allies occupy three unconnected points on the periphery of a large circle. In this particular case, however, these theoretical advantages amount to less than nothing. The central position, in field operations carried on by two armies of about equal strength, is certainly the more favorable, because it secures the shortest distances from point to point, and thereby the greatest rapidity of movement. It secures the advantage of attacking one portion of the enemy with superior force, and thereby two thirds of the chances of victory. But where strong fortified points, as Eupatoria, and positions of great natural strength, as the Chernaya, offer the means to even a greatly inferior force of holding out a considerable time against a powerful attack, these advantages are temporarily nullified. And, especially when a strong fleet of steamers, as in this case, enables the Allies, on the periphery of the circle, to move their troops quicker by sea than the Russians can by land, then the tables are turned. The Allies, though apparently on the periphery, in reality hold the center; while the Russians, though apparently placed centrally, are suffering all the disadvantages of the opposite situation. At present, the allied Generals, having given up all idea of offensive movements, cannot much avail themselves of these advantages. But this consideration shows how much they neglected their duty when, after the taking of the south side—the Russians being then from 25,000 to 35,000 men weaker than they are now—they put out cautious feelers, first in one direction and then another instead of dealing one quick and heavy blow from Eupatoria on the rear of the demoralized and weakened enemy.