Published unsigned as a leading article in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4371, April 23, 1855, p. 4, under the heading “Before Sevastopol”; attributed to Friedrich Engels by MEGA² (I/14), which first identified him as its author. Text from the original newspaper (Library of Congress, Chronicling America). Traducción al español.
The position of the Allies before Sevastopol has not improved during the last week. Better weather has certainly abated a good deal of the sickness, and restored a more cheerful character to the camp. But these are advantages in which the Russians equally participate; and the more both armies are in a state to resort to their military duties, the more important become the purely military events.
Our readers know that about the 20th of February, the Russians, becoming aware of their superiority, occupied a hill, known as Mount Sapun, east of the Careening Bay, and in spite of the Allies, succeeded in erecting a redoubt called Selenghinsk on it. They were attacked on the morning of the 24th by French columns, but maintained their ground, and very soon had that redoubt armed with guns. On the 11th of March they took a still bolder step. They occupied another hill a little south-east of the Malakoff, or Round-Tower Hill, which latter forms the main feature in the Russian lines south-west of the Careening Bay: they threw up a redoubt or other work on this point, and thus had the Malakoff Hill covered by two new outworks, one in front, the other in the left flank of it. Malakoff, being considered by the allied generals the key of the Russian lines from its commanding position, was thus effectively screened and the defenses strengthened in a way which even if defended by a less tenacious and skillfully-conducted garrison, could only be overcome by a week or ten days’ extra labor. It will remain a lasting disgrace to the men who conducted the siege to have allowed the construction of these works by the besieged, under the very ramparts of their batteries.
In the mean time, the Russians not only armed this second and more advanced redoubt with sixteen guns, but also threw up a range of rifle-pits in front of it. These rifle-pits, six in number, are small trenches, with the earth out of them forming a breastwork, covered by sand-bags. They were occupied by about sixty of the best marksmen, firing through loop holes, and very grievously annoying the opposite trench guards and batteries. Against these rifle-pits the French in vain directed three night-attacks, undertaken under the protection of their batteries, and with considerable forces. But in every instance, they were obliged, in the end, to give up the attempt, and the pits, abandoned by them, were soon reoccupied by the Russian rifles, in whose possession they have remained since the 17th of March. The aggregate losses suffered by the French in these combats must have been severe, as they had to fight uncovered under the close cross fire of the Russian batteries.
On the night of the 22d another attack appears to have been in preparation, when the Russians anticipated it by a sally. This night’s engagement was again carried on with great obstinacy on both sides, and must have caused great loss. In the short telegraphic reports concerning it, both parties claim the victory, and Canrobert even adds that the Allies lost 600, the Russians 2000 men. But evidently a much truer account of the affair is given by the correspondent of The London Morning Herald, whose narrative we publish, and who is confirmed in all points by Lord Raglan’s official dispatch. It appears that the Russian attack extended along the entire allied line on the eastern side of the town, the attempt being to occupy and destroy the French and English advanced works. The struggle began at a little after 10 in the evening, under cover of a heavy cannonade from the place. The English line was defended by a guard of some 1,500 men, who fought with that classic valor and dogged obstinacy which the English soldier has shown in every hand-to-hand encounter since the expedition first landed in the Crimea. The Russian onslaught was desperately resisted, and no damage was done to the English works. But the French were not so fortunate. They were driven from their trenches, which were occupied by the Russians for full half an hour. During this time a considerable portion of the works was destroyed; and as the English writer says, had the columns attacking the English line not been promptly and signally repulsed, the consequences to the Allies must have been very serious. The fighting in the trenches is described as terrific, the combatants firing vollies at each other when no more than twenty yards apart. The English loss is stated by Lord Raglan at 68 officers and men, killed, wounded and missing; the French loss is estimated at 500 killed and wounded, while the Russians suffered still more severely, though their loss could not have approached the figure given in Canrobert’s dispatch. The correspondent of The Times estimates it at 600 or 700. Some prisoners were taken on both sides.
The advantage in this affair was evidently with the Russians. They penetrated the hostile lines, overthrew a part of the works and spiked three of the batteries; and this was what they intended, as is proved by the fact that they had not more than 15,000 men engaged. This appears from the statement of the English writer, that the columns attacking the English numbered about 6,000, which is probably exaggerated. They retreated, as a matter of course, since every sortie ends in a retreat, and their loss was heavier than that of the Allies; but they achieved their purpose, of forestalling an attack on their own works, and damaging those of their enemies. A victory, in the sense claimed by Canrobert, it certainly was not. Nor was there about it any such character of success as could satisfy and suppress the rebellious and disorderly spirit of the French troops.
To this spirit we have before alluded, but perhaps not in sufficient detail to impress the facts upon our readers. Indeed, the state of the French army, as far as discipline is concerned, is indeed alarming. Continued inactivity, or what is worse, fruitless activity, will finally dissolve the bonds of order and obedience in any army, but more particularly, and very soon, in a French army. On the other hand, success and the unmistakable presence of an energetic and intelligent directing hand, will sooner restore discipline among the French than among any other troops. Now, since 1849, the French army has passed through many stages, all tending to the weakening of military discipline. The army was flattered first by the middle class, then by Louis Bonaparte, as the savior of order, as the élite of the country. It was openly proclaimed as the arbiter of the destinies of France. Its mass was bribed by the sausages and brandy, the fowls and champagne of Louis Bonaparte. To attach it still more to the cause of Bonapartism, discipline was relaxed, amnesties for military culprits were repeatedly issued; on one head only great severity was introduced, and that was politics. Bonapartism, with its concomitants, glory, plunder, and chances of advancement, looming in the distance, became the normal religion of the army; republicanism and socialism were proscribed, and their supporters transported to Africa, where they filled the penal companies and battalions used for the hardest work and the most dangerous posts. The mass of the army was very little affected by this proceeding. What occasion was there to talk about liberty so long as the soldier had the liberty of getting drunk as often as he liked, and could even come home after tattoo without being punished! Liberty there was for the soldier more than ever before. The Empire having been proclaimed, they tried to check this license; but what influence could be exercised over the soldiers by men like St. Arnaud and Magnan, whose appropriations of public money were in the mouths of everybody, or by L’Espinasse, who earned his General’s epaulettes by an act of downright military treason? Respect for the officers was declining, and the paladins of the Lower Empire were just the men to destroy the last vestige of it. In this deplorable state was the French army when the war broke out. The very first reverse—a reverse without having seen the enemy—the stupid expedition to the Dobrodja, was sufficient to cause almost an open insurrection in a whole division. The Zouaves, composed almost entirely of substitutes, men of doubtful career, of no principle whatever, of adventurous and unruly spirits, but of great physical strength and courage—the Zouaves, upon this as upon all opportunities, took the lead in loudly expressing their discontent, and enacting scenes which, under other circumstances, would have ended in the forcible dissolution and summary punishment of the corps, but which, as things stood, had to pass unnoticed. Alma and Inkermann for a while allayed the rebellious troops, but the long inactivity and the sufferings of winter, the hard work without any result, very soon brought out again the spirit of insubordination. Monster deputations demanding the assault, and other sorts of votes of no confidence in the generals were resorted to, and on one occasion the Zouaves even came to threaten the Commander-in-Chief. The late reverses have brought this state of insubordination to the highest pitch and unless a decisive advantage is gained, or some other successful occupation given to the troops, there is no telling what the result may be.