Published without signature as a leading article in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4524, October 19, 1855, p. 4; attributed to Friedrich Engels by MEGA² (I/14), which lists it among the writings of doubtful authorship (Dubiosa). Text after the original print of the newspaper (Library of Congress, Chronicling America). Traducción al español

Those who expected the Atlantic, which arrived yesterday, to bring decisive intelligence from the Crimea were disappointed. It is true we hear that the fleet has sailed from before Sevastopol on a secret expedition, to which conjecture gives the destination of Odessa or Nicolaïeff, and that a body of the French cavalry have had a successful engagement with some Russian horse at a place fifteen miles north of Eupatoria, in which they took six guns and a hundred and sixty prisoners, with the loss of six men killed and twenty-seven wounded on the French side. Of this event we have no details, nor any information to show that it was anything more than an accidental encounter between an outpost of the allied army about Eupatoria—said to be about forty thousand strong—and a similar force of the Russians. Still, it is very likely that this affair is the opening of a powerful movement in that direction, especially as the reconnoitering parties sent on the Russian left flank toward Aïtodor and the upper outlets of the Baidar valley report that there is no chance of turning the Russians by that work, all the passes being intrenched and strongly guarded.

On the other hand, the Russians were busy on the north side of Sevastopol evacuating certain magazines ; but as these were exposed to the fire of the French batteries, this operation cannot be taken as a certain symptom of retreat. Many indications, however, tend to show that the mass of the Russian troops has taken up a more central position near Sympheropol and Bakshiserai, from which it can move with equal rapidity either toward the Mackenzie position, the Upper Belbeck, or the Alma, according to circumstances. This step has been rendered necessary by the fall of the south side of the fortress and the consequent setting at liberty of the whole of the allied siege-corps. As long as the south side held out this was the point on which both parties had to concentrate their energies ; now there is no longer such a center for the contest, and the long line from Mackenzie to the south coast near Yalta becomes the front of defense of the Russians. A long line, especially in such broken ground as is this corner of the Crimea, can only be defended by placing the main body so far to the rear that it is enabled to reach every point liable to be attacked with equal facility; in this case, however, the proximity to the Russian rear of a hostile station like Eupatoria obliges them to draw their main body still further backward. For, with their steam fleets, the Allies could in a single night so reënforce the army of Eupatoria as to enable it to take a very energetic offensive against the Russian communications, unless the mass of the Russians, grouped somewhere about Sympheropol, could send re-enforcements to the small corps of observation now before that town. The question now is, whether the desire to place the main force so that it can assist every point with equal facility, has not necessitated its removal to such a distance from Mackenzie, Aïtodor, and the Upper Belbeck that a vigorous attack on one of these points, combined with well-conducted demonstrations against the others, might overthrow the detachments placed there before the main body could arrive. To decide this, however, the exact dislocation of the Russian army should be known.

That the Russians are in an actual movement of retreat toward Perikop we have no direct evidence to show, but the stoppage of the forwarding of supplies from Odessa and the arresting of the forward march of the reënforcements from that neighborhood, are strong indications of an intention not to engage at present any more of the resources of Russia in the Crimea. Very likely all decisive movements are stopped until the Emperor has arrived, and a great council of war been held to decide on the conduct of the war during the Winter. Meantime, the available reserves and even the first army-corps, the only one except the guards which was still intact, are marching southward, being replaced in their late positions by the militia.

The Atlantic brings us some Russian documents on the late decisive events at Sevastopol including Gorchakoff's siege journal up to Sept 7, the eve of the assault. A portion of it is transferred to our columns, showing how hotly contested every inch of ground was during the last month of the siege. During this time the Russians admit having lost from five hundred to one thousand men daily, or about twenty-two thousand in all. Add to these the eight thousand lost on the Chernaya, and ten thousand probably lost during the assault, and we arrive at forty thousand men disabled or killed, amounting to nearly the effective force of a Russian army-corps! Such a loss in a single month in action alone (beside the men lost by sickness) does indeed justify Gorchakoff in saying that he had resolved on abandoning the south side even before the assault was given. Sevastopol was certainly becoming too dear for Russia. A detailed history of this last and most severe period of the siege must prove highly interesting whenever it may be published. The fire of from twelve hundred to fifteen hundred guns, the rifle-pit war on the whole of the long front, the subterraneous war of mines carried on with an energy recalling the time before Vauban, the pushing of trenches up to the edge of the ditch in four or five different places—all this is so colossal in comparison to the common sieges figuring in military history that, even with the many errors committed on both sides, this siege will form one of the most memorable military events of all time. Its greatest importance, however, is this: that it has forever demonstrated the immense strength of large fortresses, forming in themselves a pivot for an army. If Sevastopol could do this, what might not be done by Paris?

Fortresses, where they have not a merely local importance, can in future but form the nuclei of large intrenched camps, protected in most instances by detached forts of permanent construction. Fortresses, and groups of fortresses especially, will have a value so long only as they can serve as pivots for an army in the field, which again protects them from permanent blockade. Theoretical writers had recognized this long since, but practice had never shown an example of a defense demonstrating it on a large scale. Sevastopol has done so, and hence its great importance for military history.