Published without signature as a leading article in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4531, October 27, 1855, pp. 4-5; attributed to Friedrich Engels by MEGA² (I/14). Text after the original print of the newspaper (Library of Congress, Chronicling America). Traducción al español
We have sought carefully through the files of European journals, which reached us late yesterday afternoon by way of Boston, for any decisive indications as to the course of the Crimean campaign, and we must confess have sought nearly in vain. Perhaps the most important fact established is that the Allies have been able repeatedly to penetrate into the valley of the upper Belbek without meeting with any resistance in the mountain passes between that valley and that of Baidar. This shows what is the real defensive position of the Russians on their left flank. From Aitodor and Mangup Kalè, a steep line of rocky hights runs, by Chufut Kalè (the Jewish suburb of Bakseshirai) to Sympheropol, where it loses itself in the plain. This ridge, steep toward the south-east, as all mountains in the Crimea are, slopes off very gently toward the north-west, forming a plateau which extends uninterruptedly to the sea toward the west, while on the north it gradually loses itself in the lower steppes of the Northern Crimea. The rocks forming the edge of this plateau toward the south-east, and the plateau itself, are pierced by a few passes only, principally where the Belbek, the Katsha, the Alma, and their tributaries, force their passage toward the sea. Thus, while the ridge itself, at least as far as Chufut Kalè, may be considered impassable to troops, the few passes leading through it form defiles easily defended, and which, if intrenched, may be considered as almost impregnable. The line from Mackenzie by Aitodor to Chufut Kalè is rather more than fifteen miles, which is certainly a good length of front; but the main points of possible attack being known, the mass of the troops can be stationed toward the rear, so as to be able to march down to any menaced point. It is certainly a disadvantage that Bakshiserai, the nearest chief depot, is situated almost in the very front of defense, and another disadvantage, that Sympheropol, the principal depot of the whole Crimea, and in fact the whole line of retreat, is situated in the prolongation of the front, not behind it; but the greatest disadvantage is that the whole of this line can be turned by a few days' march.
Our readers may remember we stated long ago, all the possible modes of turning the Russian position, and that even then the more advantageous course seemed to be a turning march by Alushta, along the coast, round by the Chatyr Dagh, and down the valley of the Salghir direct upon Sympheropol. What we then stated is still our opinion, and the late events, together with the certainty now acquired respecting the Russian defensive position, have still more confirmed it.
All the possible approaches to the Russian position from the south and south-east are by mere Tartar country-roads or sheep-tracks, unfit for the movements of an army in a season when rain may be expected, as a day's rain renders them completely impassable. There are two highroads only, that from Traktir bridge to Mackenzie's and that from Alushta to Sympheropol. It is true the French are constructing roads toward Aitodor, but to make a road before operating on it would be to give up operations for this year at once. Now, however a macadamized road may be spoiled, cut up and destroyed, it can always be easily repaired in a country rich in stone and wood, such as the south-eastern coast and hills of the Crimea. Thus, if it can be shown that the road by Alushta is acceptable on military grounds, it must certainly have the preference before all other approaches to the Russian position.
The Upper Belbek is open to the French, because they have been there. From the Upper Belbek there are several country roads toward the Upper Katsha; thence others lead into the valley of the Upper Alma, and the country between the Upper Alma, the Upper Salghir and the coast is intersected by more roads and paths, encircling Chatyr Dagh on all sides, than any other part of the Crimean hills. The distance from Baidar valley to the village of Salghir, on the river of that name and on the northern foot of Chatyr Dagh, is about thirty miles, an extent of front not large for a country of Alpine conformation and with comparatively few passes from valley to valley. In the Alpine and Spanish mountain-wars, armies of less strength than the Allies could spare, were almost always expected to occupy far more ground. As the impracticability of the roads in that neighborhood is confined to artillery only, and but partially to cavalry, while infantry and light cavalry would everywhere be able to move, though perhaps after rains with difficulty; and as plenty of passes lead down toward the south coast, thus securing the retreat, there could be no difficulty in gradually extending the allied outpost as far as the Upper Alma, keeping supports of infantry, and perhaps mountain artillery among the hills to the rear, and pushing a column along the coast toward Alushta. If this has been carried out, and the Russian position thoroughly reconnoitered, the system of false attacks would have to be extensively employed, until finally the chief column advances upon the pass of the Chatyr Dagh, where no doubt it will find itself arrested by strong intrenchments well guarded. But here the detachments of the Upper Katsha and Alma would be ready to march by the country roads down into the valley of the Salghir, and turn these intrenchments. This might be done, unless the season be too far advanced; it is nothing more than what has been done in every instance of mountain warfare. That this movement, if properly executed, would force the Russians to open the pass, is certain; and at every point where the Russians make a stand it can be repeated, until the whole of the Salghir valley as far as Sympheropol, where the plain begins, is opened; and then either the Russians would have to offer battle, or to retreat in haste.
There are only three reasons why the allied generals may avoid this course of action. First, the Russians might, while the main force of the Allies is on the south coast, detach a strong body from any point of their position, and by the Upper Belbek and Katcha, march upon the hills, cross them and descend to the coast road, thus cutting off and turning the position of the allied army intended to turn them. This maneuver would, however, be so full of risk to the corps executing it, that it is not likely to be attempted. The allied troops cut off by it, would be able to reëmbark on board the fleets, which would of necessity have to be about the south coast during the whole of the operation, or to march toward Kertch, where no troops of equal strength could stop them on the road. And if the troops remaining west of the Russian corps that would have so descended to the coast, were to attack it in flank and rear, its doom would soon be fixed.
Then it may be possible that while the main body of the Allies is engaged in an operation which cannot be decided in less than six or eight days, the main body of the Russians may attack the troops left to defend Chernaya, Balaklava and Inkermann. But here a sufficient force could be left, and the Russians have a too lively remembrance of previous attempts of the kind to repeat them readily. Besides, if their main body should be defeated there, while their rear is menaced from Eupatoria and from Alushta, their retreat would be a route ending at Perekop only. And even if they were to succeed, what then? Sympheropol, Bakshiserai, &c., would be almost sure to fall, all their magazines would be lost, and they would be in Sevastopol again, but without stores, and without communication with the interior, the armies of Alushta and Eupatoria being in possession of the Crimea. Thus, in any case, the march by Alushta, even if not altogether successful, could not end in disaster so long as the present forces of the Allies were well managed, and the plan properly executed. A third difficulty might be found in the weather and the advanced season. As to this we can only say, that if it had been undertaken immediately after the fall of the south side of Sevastopol, such an expedition would have been but certain to succeed.