Published unsigned as a leading article, under the headline “From the Crimea”, in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4556, November 26, 1855, p. 4; attributed to Friedrich Engels by MEGA² (I/14), which dates it November 9, 1855. Text from the original newspaper (Library of Congress, Chronicling America). Traducción al español.
After all, the Russians are going to defend the Crimea. Prince Gorchakoff’s order of the day, in which he announces this intention, has reached us by the mail of the Canada. The Emperor had indeed left it to his judgment whether the present position should be held or whether the peninsula should be abandoned; and Gorchakoff in reply proclaims his intention to remain where he is. The two divisions of grenadiers, with their division of artillery, have arrived in Sympheropol; they are said to be twenty-two thousand strong, and to have brought a convoy of eight thousand bullock-carts with them, which furnishes ample supplies for six or eight months. According to some reports Gorchakoff is even preparing to take the offensive again, and to operate against Eupatoria.
That the grenadiers may muster about twenty-two thousand men is possible enough. They belong to those portions of the Russian army the ranks of which are always best filled up. Their march from Poland to Perekop was executed pretty slowly and in the best season of the year. That a division of twelve battalions (for the grenadier regiments, like the guards, have but three battalions to the regiment) should therefore even now muster ten thousand effectives or about eight hundred and thirty men per battalion, is not at all improbable. But it must not be thought that this number is so much net increase to the Crimean army; for, as we have before mentioned, sundry portions of that army have been sent to Nikolaieff and Cherson, especially a portion of the sailors and marines (five equipages or battalions) and the fourteenth reserve division (eight reserve battalions). Estimating these bodies at ever so low a figure we still must put them down at from five thousand to seven thousand in all, so that the net numerical increase will amount to about fifteen thousand. The total Russian infantry of the line and grenadiers now in the Crimea cannot exceed one hundred and forty thousand men, to which perhaps twenty-six thousand reserves, Chornomor Cossacks, sailors, marines, militia and volunteers may be added; the cavalry of the line may number ten thousand, the Cossack cavalry another ten thousand, the artillery in all fifteen thousand, making a total of one hundred and seventy-five thousand men, which at a rough guess we think is the very outside of what the Russians now have in the Crimea.
The Allies are not much superior in numbers. The fourteen divisions of French infantry will not muster above 100,000, their three divisions cavalry 6,000, their artillery, etc., 12,000—in all 118,000 men. The English, according to semi-official statements, are 56,000 strong—from which number there are, however, to be deducted some 5,000 sick and wounded, and some 6,000 of those parasitical non-combatants whom the British always carry about with themselves over and above other armies, so that their actual force cannot be put down at more than 45,000 men. The Sardinians muster rather less than 10,000, and the Turks at Eupatoria certainly do not exceed 20,000 men. The grand total for the Allies is thus about 190,000 men. Considering that the Russians occupy a central position while the Allies are scattered over three distinct positions without any direct land communication between each other—at Eupatoria, Sevastopol and Kertch—the Russians are, after the arrival of the grenadiers, fully equal to the Allies, in physical strength; but morally they must be infinitely inferior. In spite of this moral inferiority, it is likely enough that Gorchakoff may risk an attack upon Eupatoria. The terror caused among his troops by the loss of south Sevastopol must have worn off long since through the incapacity of the Allies in following up that success; and the arrival of élite troops like the grenadiers must have still more elated them with renewed hopes of success. But unless the Allies allow themselves to be caught unawares, which with their recent cautious proceedings is not very likely, Gorchakoff will most probably only send his grenadiers to the same fate to which the Third and Fourth corps were sent at Inkermann, the Second corps at the Chernaya, and the Caucasian troops at Kars. And he will have to mind what he does; for one more defeat, if incurred after an obstinate struggle, and well followed up by the victors, may necessitate that disastrous retreat through the steppes, of which we have spoken on former occasions.
Before the arrival of the grenadiers, according to the statements given above, the Allies mustered 190,000 against 160,000 Russians—a far more favorable proportion for active operations. The Heracleatic Chersonese and the Baidar valley could have been held by a force fully equal to what the Russians could bring against them, while of the surplus of 30,000 at least 20,000 might have been sent to Eupatoria; so that, by the inactivity of the allies, not only the favorable season but even the favorable proportions of numbers has been lost. And as Eupatoria menaced the Russian communications, every increase of the allied forces there was sure to draw off more Russians from the front opposite the allied main army, and thereby again to liberate fresh troops for Eupatoria, or to render feasible an attack upon some point of that Russian front. But nothing was done, and now Winter sets in and leaves everything to chance and accident.
We have previously alluded to the disastrous consequences a severe Winter may bring on this large Russian army in the Crimea, with most of the regiments bivouacking and short of firewood. But it seems John Bull is determined to give the Russians fair play. If they have to bivouac, his own troops must do the same. The British army is expected, as a matter of course, to lose from sickness a proportionate number with the Russians. About one-third of the Britons are going to have hut accommodations. The remainder must look out for themselves. We had Balaklava last winter, we may have something worse now. In the meantime the British army diverts itself from all unpleasant thoughts by getting tipsy. The soldiers get 7½d. a day in cash out of their pay, then the “Queen’s sixpence,” or daily allowance to troops before the enemy, and eight pence are allowed for work done on the roads and the like. This makes one shilling nine pence half-penny a day, a sum on which a man can get as drunk as a fiddler in any part of her Britannic Majesty’s dominions, but especially at Balaklava where spirits are as cheap as they are strong, and where nothing else beside spirits is to be bought. Consequently the soldiers get drunk as fast and as often as they can. Drunkenness is the rule, sobriety the exception; and this The London Times admits. What the effect of this is upon the discipline, efficiency and health of the army, may well be imagined. The officers are powerless. The cat-o’-nine works day and night to no purpose. Flog a British soldier once for drunkenness, and next time he is tipsy he will report himself and request to be put down for another dozen. In fact, as a disciplined, organized body, the British army may be said not to exist for the moment, its existence being, as it were, suspended. And yet no other army, except the Russian, applies such severe means to ensure discipline.
The abundance of money, and the inability to procure other useful and agreeable commodities for it, is at the bottom of all this. Now, nothing would be plainer for the Commander-in-Chief than at once to suspend the payment of the Queen’s sixpence, and to do away with the ridiculous allowance for a labor which is part and parcel of soldier’s duty. But no; sooner let him flog whole regiments out of existence than employ such revolutionary measures! The Government has ordained that the soldier shall have his Queen’s sixpence there and then; the allowance for working parties is customary, and sooner be the whole army drowned in a sea of gin and raki than that such sacred regulations and hallowed customs should be touched.
All idea of a movement in advance seems to have been given up by the Allies. They are occupied with nothing but preparations for the Winter. The grand result of the late reconnaissances is, that nothing more is to be done. Meantime, the Russians give us some information about these mysterious reconnaissances. It appears that the French advanced from Urkusta at the head of the Baidar, or rather Upper Chernaya valley, across the hills toward the ravines sloping down to the Upper Belbek. Slowly, very slowly, they advanced, about two miles a day, sometimes retiring again for a few days. They occupied Koluluz and Yanseu, and at last attempted a combined movement on three roads; two French columns penetrated—the one by Koluluz to Yenisala; the other by Uzurju toward Markul and then to Yenisala; a Piedmontese column attempted to force a passage from the Upper Chulin and Adim Chokrak toward Karlu. In other words, three parallel columns marched across the hills concentrically toward Foti-Sala on the Upper Belbek. The Piedmontese column, which formed the left of the movement, was stopped at once before it could cross the hills; it was so near the Russian front that its advance would have amounted to a flank march along and within reach of that front, and it had to halt. The two French columns occupied Yenisala without serious resistance, and gained the line of the Belbek. They even penetrated beyond it, occupied Foti-Sala, and attempted to scale the hights in its rear. But here, toward Airgul, they saw the Russian columns drawn up on the plateau and fell back again to Foti-Sala. Meantime the Russians had not been idle. While their troops from Airgul demonstrated against the French front, strong detachments from Kutshuk and Biuk-Sivren, where the Belbek enters the Russian front, ascended that river toward Albat, thence marching up a side valley to their right, by which they turned the left of the French advance. At the same time, other columns from Ulusala, on the Upper Katsha, crossed over toward Tatar Osmankoi, near the source of the Belbek, from which point they menaced the French right. Finally, the Russian irregular troops still occupied the plateau of Mount Yaila, which overhangs to the south the valley of the Upper Chernaya, and thereby menaced to some extent the French rear—at all events confining their lines of operation to a very narrow strip of ground. But before the net was closed around them, the French withdrew to the hights above Urkusta, where they still are, unless they have retired still further.
The whole of these maneuvers were undertaken by the French with a force amounting to no less than four divisions of infantry, or at least 26,000 to 28,000 men. From the particulars given in the Russian reports we should judge that two divisions acted while the other two remained in reserve. Now such a force, in mountain warfare, is very considerable and about the maximum of what can be usefully employed on two converging roads, or in the narrow valley of an Alpine river. The force, then, was amply sufficient for any work to be cut out for it; but the whole of the maneuvers of this corps, commanded, we believe, by General De Salles, bear an unmistakable character of groping hesitation, and of a complete absence of any definite purpose to be pursued resolutely. In all mountain warfare it is of the highest importance to begin, if possible, by mastering the main ridge from which the chief valleys descend. This ridge was, here, the Yaila. The Yaila could be easily cleared of Russians, as it runs parallel and close to the south coast, which again is under the fire of the allied ships of war. The Yaila, besides, is not a mere rocky ledge, but a plateau affording good pasturage for sheep, and therefore, for some time at least, for a moderate number of horses also. The Russians, indeed, have occupied it with Cossack cavalry, and, if we are to judge by the maps, the ground is very well adapted for light cavalry maneuvers, though 2,000 feet above the level of the sea. Before any attempts were made to descend into the valley of the Upper Belbek that valley might have been turned completely by a few squadrons taking possession of the Yaila plateau, and opening the road for a column of infantry which might have descended, partly by the Biuk-Uzen, partly by the Uzen Bash (the two rivers forming, by their junction, the Belbek). The longest march to be made, from Uzunyu to Tatar Osmankoi, does not exceed 24 miles. The whole could be easily done in two days, and troops carrying four days’ provisions, could have undertaken it with perfect safety. The Yaila plateau once secured, the march of this turning column would, of course, have to be supported by columns advancing on the ground where De Salles actually did advance. But then, what a different position would the corps have been in! Instead of being threatened by Tatar Osmankoi, that important position would be in its hands, and along with the possession of the Yaila, would afford to it the means of even threatening the right of the Russians on the Upper Katsha. Then the Russian columns above Foti-Sala, near Airgul, would themselves have been outflanked, and the flanking march now made by the Russians toward the French left would have been isolated and without any importance whatever. By such a combination the French might not only have gained far more extensive information and reconnoitered a greater extent of ground than they now have done by pushing two isolated columns right into a narrow valley in front of the enemy’s center; they might even have gained some actual success, and compelled the Russians to abandon many a square mile of valuable territory. We will not at present say that General De Salles might not have had reasons, unknown to us, which would justify him in preferring the mode of operation he adopted; but the surprising slowness with which he executed his reconnoissance of about four miles of ground (it took him nearly a week) and the irresolution and over-caution manifest in every step he made, induce us to believe that there was such an original vice as we have tried to explain in this last field operation of the main army of the Allies.