Published unsigned as a leading article, under the headline “From the Crimea”, in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4511, October 4, 1855, p. 4; attributed to Friedrich Engels by MEGA² (I/14), which dates it September 21, 1855, and lists it among the writings of doubtful authorship (Dubiosa). A few words in a damaged spot of the print are conjectural and given in square brackets. Text from the original newspaper (Library of Congress, Chronicling America). Traducción al español.
Contrary to our expectation, the Pacific brings no confirmation of that rumor which the previous steamer had reported from Paris, according to which the allied commanders had no sooner occupied the abandoned Russian works at Sevastopol, than they began to send an army to Eupatoria to take the Russians in the flank, and compel them to fight a battle in the field, or at once abandon the Crimea. If any such movement has taken place, it is carefully concealed not only from the European public, but from the Russian Commander-in-Chief, whose dispatches come down to the 17th ult., and who states that no change had taken place at Sevastopol. As far as all our advices from the allied camp go, it would seem that the generals were so overwhelmed with their sudden and unexpected success, that they had not the slightest idea of following it up; while the important business of classing the cannon and counting the shot found in Sevastopol would appear to leave them no time for ulterior operations; in fact, Pelissier seems to have nothing better to do than to imitate Marius on the ruins of Carthage.
It is possible, however, but not probable, that under this silence of the telegraph, and in spite of the ignorance of Gorchakoff, one of the two movements which alone seem to promise a rapid termination of the campaign may have been set forward. In that case the next steamer must bring the report of a sudden attack upon the line of communications on which the Russian army in the North Fort and on Mackenzie’s Hights depends for its supplies. But as we say, such a demonstration is not probable. Had it really been undertaken, we could hardly have failed to be informed of it. It may well be called impossible to move 50,000 or 70,000 troops without the knowledge of an opposing general encamped upon a commanding hight within eyeshot of one port of embarkation, and with his outposts in view of the other. It is then a reasonable conclusion that entire inaction prevailed in the allied lines from the 9th to the 17th ult.; and this is a great military error on the part of the generals.
Here is an army of some 240,000 men, amply provided with cavalry and field-artillery, flushed by victory, having obtained a success which they had no right whatever to expect so suddenly, opposed to an army six times beaten, inferior in numbers, moral character, and tactical mobility—and yet this superior and victorious army confines itself to the small spot of ground to which it clung when it was the weaker party! True enough, the late Crimean correspondent of The London Herald gives us a formidable description of the Russian position on the Mackenzie Hights, and maintains that there is no way of turning it, on account of the want of roads; but even if that were the case, Eupatoria is there, a bridge-head by which the Allies can debouch with 60,000 or even 100,000 men on the Russian rear. Besides, what is alleged about the impracticability of the ground about Yalta, is all derived from hearsay, as no allied officer ever reconnoitered that ground, and the existing maps show plenty of foot-paths and sheep-tracks. Besides, the Crimean chalk hills are nothing like the Alps or Pyrenees with respect to impracticability. The long, lazy, drowsy siege seems to have produced, particularly in the English camp, a sort of sleepiness and immobility, which would make generals and subalterns almost loathe a campaign in the field. Whenever an advance is spoken of hundreds of difficulties are raised, and the plainest movement is made to look almost impossible. The slow-coach system, so inherent in the British army, seems to have got the upper hand completely: and even to have infected the French. The courage spent in the attack of Sevastopol seems to have drawn so largely on the moral resources of the Allies that the instinctive sense which to everybody suggests an immediate following up of the victory, appears to have been completely wanting in their councils of war. Is it the case that they have so long and so stubbornly stuck to one object that, this object once attained, they have lost all power of initiative, and do not appreciate their own position?
Meanwhile the Czar declares in a letter to the King of Prussia—of which we elsewhere publish a summary—that Russia will not make peace after defeat; and all the remainder of her disposable troops are ordered to the South. The first army-corps will very likely continue to occupy Poland; but the Guards are by this time on the march, and it is even said that the Emperor Alexander and his two brothers will now go to the seat of war. But on the other hand, the French are busy embarking troops at Marseilles and Toulon; regiment after regiment is sent off as soon as the steamers arrive, and the hurry is such that they are ordered to go straight to Kamiesh without touching at Constantinople. There is, besides, a great French cavalry reserve to be formed at that capital, while the English cavalry reserves are to concentrate at Scutari. The attention paid to this arm looks as if a campaign in Bessarabia were in contemplation for next year.
As for the Crimea itself, the intelligence by this steamer exhibits its entire loss to the Russians as less certain than it appeared before. They have suffered a terrible blow not only as regards honor and other points sneered at by Falstaff, but as regards both military strength and exchangeable value. The danger of further calamity to them is also most imminent, but yet it is possible that they may escape it. In a couple of weeks things there may greatly change. The moral depression of the Russians may cease when they see that their opp[onents] have not d[isplayed the] quickness of resolution [whi]ch alone a[ssures th]e fruits of victory. The provisions w[hich h]ave perhaps failed for a time may after all be forthcoming, and wi[th the]m the Grenadiers and the rest of the second corps will not fail to make their appearance. In war affairs change often and rapidly, and whoever loses the propitious moment may lose a campaign or at least the results of a victory. As the Russian position is unassailable in front, and the Allies must always be under the necessity of maintaining their communications with the plateau of Sevastopol, their base of operations, the Russians have the advantage of the central position. The Allies, to turn them, must divide themselves and yet keep a strong army in reserve for the defense of the long line from Inkermann to Balaklava; so that this line being opposed to the unassailable Russian front, about 80,000 or more of the allied troops will remain almost useless until the Mackenzie Hights are abandoned by the Russians.
We repeat, the position is impregnable in front. But it can be turned on both flanks, either by Eupatoria or by the south coast, not to speak of the roundabout route of Kertch. And if such a turning is attempted at once, with that force which the Allies can now give to it, we repeat it must succeed. But if it is not attempted, or too late, or with insufficient forces, nobody can answer for the result. But whatever may happen, the question of provisioning the Russian army must play the most important part. We have no direct evidence as to the state in which it is in this respect, and the want of all complete details respecting the taking of the south side of Sevastopol and the circumstances connected with it, makes it impossible to judge for the present. Until, therefore, we receive definite news on that subject, all speculations on the impending military events in the Crimea have but a relative value.