Published unsigned as a leading article, under the headline “The Crimean War”, in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4534, October 31, 1855, p. 4; attributed to Friedrich Engels by MEGA² (I/14), which dates it October 9, 1855, and prints it for the first time since 1855. Text from the original newspaper (Library of Congress, Chronicling America). Traducción al español.
The steamer Baltic is due here to-day from Liverpool with a week’s later news, which may very likely prove to be of great importance. It is true that if the same deliberation were to be observed forever in the movements of the Allies, Marshal Pelissier, with his advanced age, could scarcely hope to reach Perekop during the term of his mortal career. But we may be sure that this tardy pace will presently give way to more impetuous movements; and meanwhile it may be worth our while to examine more in detail some of the recent features of the campaign, to which we have not before been able to give all the attention they merit.
We have already noticed the battle fought at a distance of fifteen miles from Eupatoria, between the French cavalry under d’Allonville and the Russian cavalry under Korff, in which the latter were routed, with heavy losses of guns and ammunition wagons taken from their mounted artillery. The details of this affair are not yet at hand; but we know that the Russians have long had a considerable body of horse observing Eupatoria, and that this force should be so signally beaten by a few French regiments augurs badly for them. That, under such circumstances, they should lose so much more than the French is not surprising. In a cavalry action the principal loss is undergone by the defeated party during the pursuit, after all tactical order, and with it all force of resistance, has vanished. The Russian horse-artillery appears to have exposed itself very bravely in order to redeem the check inflicted on the cavalry, otherwise the loss of nearly a whole battery is hardly to be explained. Any how, even before the details arrive, we think we may say that this first action has decidedly proved the superiority of the French over the Russian cavalry. Moreover, with this peculiar arm moral impulse is everything, and all the physical elements are subordinate. Therefore we shall very likely find that while the allied horsemen will henceforth always attack the Russians with that dash and intrepidity which made the charge of Balaklava an exploit even more grand than stupid, the Russian cavalry will be very shy in meeting them, and shy cavalry are worse than none at all.
On the opposite wing of the allied position, the cautious reconnaissances up the valley of Baidar and the hights encircling it have, after many gropings, at last led them, as we recently explained, across the ridge of hills which divides the waters of the Upper Chernaya from those of the Upper Belbek. The Allies have twice descended into the valley of the Belbek, but both times they retired before nightfall to the Baidar hights. These facts we know from Gorchakoff himself. Now a glance on the map shows that as soon as the ridge separating the Baidar valley from the Belbek valley is once passed, the flank of the position of Inkermann and Mackenzie is as good as turned; for though the singular formation of the Crimean hills, invariably steep on their south-eastern, and gradually descending on their north-western slope, and other features of the ground, might favor the Russians in attempting to bar the valley, yet in all mountainous countries the commanding position always belongs to the party who descend from the higher ground, and this advantage, with sufficient forces, will always outweigh all minor, local and accidental advantages. Therefore, if the Allies follow up at once, and with a force adequate to the purpose, the advantages once gained, they must succeed in turning and thereby making untenable the present strong position of their opponents. It is true the valley of the Belbek may be so fortified that any attempt to force its lower course will be attended with a loss equaling that of a front attack on Mackenzie’s hights; but once the Upper Belbek secured, the road into the interior of the Crimea is opened. So that this apparently modest advantage, if properly followed up, gives the Allies the certainty of driving the Russians out of the Crimea very shortly.
There are, as we have repeatedly shown, great advantages in the attempt to turn the Russian position by the left, either by the Baidar hights or by the south coast. There the main body of the Allies can be concentrated without the knowledge of the Russians, who can see every vessel sailing to Eupatoria; and when the proper time has arrived, it can be brought against them at once. In that case, neither Balaklava nor the plateau of the Chersonese can be menaced, for the Russians will be at once attacked on their most vital point; and even a check cannot end in a disaster, as the base of operation is near, and the south coast under the command of the fleets. A demonstration from Eupatoria, with the intention of following up energetically the first symptoms of approaching retreat in the Russian camp, is very proper; but the main attack should, we think, be made from the south-east on the Russian left. It would appear that Pelissier has adopted this plan, though perhaps rather late. The third corps, (d’Herbillon’s,) the two Sardinian divisions, and the Turkish division had hitherto occupied the line of the Chernaya, with d’Allonville’s cavalry in the Baidar valley. Since d’Allonville’s removal to Eupatoria, other detachments of cavalry have been sent, along with infantry, to Baidar; the first French corps (de Salle’s) has marched down, four divisions strong, to the Chernaya, and since then considerable bodies, drawn from this new-formed army, have occupied Baidar, and reconnoitered as far as the Belbek. Seven French, two Sardinian and one Turkish division of infantry, one English and one Turkish division, beside a French and a Sardinian brigade of cavalry, and the necessary field artillery, form an army of some 100,000 men, and they all appear destined to act against the center and left of the Russians. They now have secured the road into the interior; if they follow it up as they ought to do, the Crimea ought to be theirs in a fortnight.
Whatever may be said of the slowness of Pelissier’s movements, there is one thing which must be acknowledged: the reign of the gossiping old women that flourished in the allied camp till very lately, he has effectually put a stop to. He has reintroduced some military discipline among the field-officers and generals, not only of his own, but of the other armies. No staff-officer, not even the English commander-in-chief, is any longer allowed to telegraph, for the edification of the world, any news about the plans, projects and preparatory movements agreed upon at headquarters. What we know of the movements of the Allies we know by newspaper correspondents whose letters are a fortnight on the road to London, or else from the dispatches of Gorchakoff. Neither Pelissier, nor La Marmora, nor old Father Simpson gives us any clue: for the latter worthy this seems, indeed, a relief, to judge from his previous dispatches. But the introduction of this system, at all events, shows that a man is at the head of the French army, who, by his own moral superiority, can command the deference of the other generals-in-chief, nominally his equals, and who can at the same time afford to treat with a certain degree of contempt the craving for news exhibited by the allied governments at home. Pelissier seems to know that since the fall of Sevastopol he, and not Louis Bonaparte, is Emperor in the Crimea. From that event his tone has remarkably changed; and he is perfectly right. Every government will turn any piece of news that looks favorable into a political engine, a moyen de gouvernement; and if a commander before the enemy has to deal with two such reckless and meddling individuals as Louis Bonaparte and Lord Palmerston, he has every reason to give them no more news than he can help. On the other hand, as to intelligence of real interest to the public, Pelissier has given us more than any other of the allied generals in the Crimea. His reports, and that of General Niel, on the taking of the south side, were models of their kind, clear, lucid, detailed without being over-professional; they put to the shade even those Russian reports whose business-like style we have had occasion more than once to mention favorably.
After all, Pelissier has so far proved himself the best soldier in the Crimea. Whether he is as good a strategist, he has yet to show.