Published unsigned as a leading article in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4422, June 21, 1855, p. 4, under the heading “The Crimean War”. MEGA² (I/14) prints an article with this title in its appendix among the articles of Friedrich Engels reworked by the editors of the Tribune; the identification with this leading article is ours, by title and date, and the extent of Engels’s share cannot be determined. Text from the original newspaper (Library of Congress, Chronicling America). Traducción al español.
The Allies are exhibiting a degree of energy in their proceedings in the Crimea which certainly offers a favorable contrast to their previous blundering and vacillating course. On the heels of Sir Edmund Lyons’s exploits in the Sea of Azoff we now have the news—brought by the arrival of the Asia at Halifax yesterday—of the storm and capture of the White Tower and the Mamelon, with great slaughter on both sides.
Precisely what fortification is meant by the White Tower we do not know. There was a fort known by that name on the south-west side of Sevastopol which was reported to have been destroyed by the Allies last Fall, but afterward turned out to be in tolerable condition. But on this point we withhold further remark till we are in possession of more complete details from our correspondence and files of European journals. With regard to the Mamelon and its capture we can now form some opinion. This is one of a series of three earth-works thrown up in February and March by the Russians far in advance of their main lines. The first of these redoubts is that called Selinghinsk on Mount Sapun, an elevation east of the Careening Bay, or between that Bay and the head of the main harbor. For above four months this hill was neglected, until on the night of Feb. 2 the Russians went there and began to throw up a redoubt. On the night of the 22d, the Allies having paid no attention to what was going on, the labor was renewed, and with such effect that Gen. Canrobert determined if possible to put an end to the hostile enterprise. For that purpose a force of Zouaves and Marines under Gen. Monet gallantly attacked the hill about 2 o’clock on the morning of Feb. 24. The Russians made a desperate resistance, but were driven from the redoubt with great slaughter on both sides, and the French remained in possession. But when day dawned the victorious Zouaves found it impossible to keep their new position. In short, it was commanded by the Russian main lines and was directly exposed to their fire. Sapun was accordingly abandoned by the French and was reoccupied, strengthened and armed with cannon by the Russians. The latter next proceeded on March 12 to throw up another similar work on another hill—south of their lines and nearly 600 yards in advance of the Malakoff bastion— between the Careening Bay and the inner harbor. To this hill, from its form, the French gave the name of Mamelon; it has been the object of heated conflicts, but the Russians have maintained possession until now. Between it and Sapun a third redoubt has also been erected by them and the three have been connected by trenches. The whole were intended to serve more as offensive counter-approaches against the besiegers than as adding any positive strength to the defense. They are all flanked and commanded by the Russian lines, and especially by Malakoff.
The value of the Mamelon to the Allies depends entirely on a point with regard to which we have no definite information. This is whether they have also erected and armed batteries to engage Malakoff and the rest of the Russian main lines. If they have, the reduction and silencing of the Mamelon will not only relieve them from its harassing fire, but will enable them, so soon as they have taken the other two abandoned works, to carry their trenches considerably forward toward the main ditch. If they have not, the Mamelon will have to be abandoned now as Sapun was on Feb. 24, and may be reoccupied by the Russians the next night. On this question we must wait for more complete information. We knew from the correspondence of The London Times that as late as May 21 no such batteries were in existence; according to that authority, the allied lines must then have been as much as 700 yards or more from Malakoff; but what was done between that time and the time of the assault we shall learn, we trust, by the mail of the Asia, which will be due here to-morrow morning.
How far the capture of these two fortifications justifies the exultation which our dispatch shows it has caused in England, it is hardly necessary to state. It is certainly something toward the reduction of Sevastopol; but compared with the whole of that immense undertaking it is like a grain of sand in a bushel. Gen. Canrobert thought that to carry the place by storm, would involve the loss of 40,000 men; and considering that there are three regular lines of defense, that each street is barricaded and armed with cannon, and each building loopholed, and that the Russians would fight there better and more effectively than anywhere else, that estimate does not seem exaggerated. But in spite of all boasting and excitement at London and Paris, we do not yet believe that the allied Generals have an idea of attempting to storm the place until after a campaign in the field, the defeat of the Russian army in two or three pitched battles, and the definite cutting off of supplies and reénforcements coming to the garrison by way of Perekop. Still there is just now some show of probability in favor of an assault at an earlier day.
With regard to the value of the successes in the Sea of Azoff we have already expressed our opinion and see no reason to change it. But while we abstain from further explanations on that subject we will cite some important statements made by Mr. Cobden in the House of Commons in the course of a very able and brilliant speech on the night of the 5th inst. In so doing we mark a few passages in italics. Mr. Cobden said:
“He was speaking at a moment when the country was excited by the recent intelligence from the seat of war. Now if any one studied the maps of the scene of the operations, it would be seen how much was made out of very little, although it had done much to increase the confidence of the people. He placed no limits to the power of England and France if they put out their strength, but he was not so sure that our position in the Crimea was as supposed. He had been in communication with a gentleman with regard to the supply of food to the Russians in the Crimea, and he did not learn from him that Sevastopol depended on Kertch for food. He was told by this gentleman, (and it ought to damp this unwarranted exultation), who was a holder of corn at Kertch, that the Russian Government had stated to him five months ago that they could not be responsible for the safety of his corn. Five months ago Russia gave notice that it was intended to abandon Kertch, and no doubt it was the same with Berdiansk and other places in the Sea of Azoff. From what he gathered there was great exaggeration with regard to this expedition to the Sea of Azoff. If there was really anything in it, what must now be the reflection of those who had the ships to undertake it long ago? Were we sure that the expedition was not occasioned by the same cause which took our troops from Gallipoli to Varna and from Varna to the Crimea—the cry of ‘Do something’ [Hear, hear]. If ever a Government or a commander did something because they were told to do something, and for no other reason, the chances were a hundred to one that they would do something wrong [Hear, hear]. He was not sure that the expedition was caused by anything but because the Government was called on to do something, and he would now record his deliberate opinion that, while the proceedings in the Sea of Azoff were destroying private property and would not add to the luster of our arms, he believed that they could have no better effect on the war than the marauding expeditions last year in the Gulf of Finland had on Cronstadt. He believed that the supplies of Sevastopol came entirely from Perekop, and that that place and Sympheropol were strongly fortified like Sevastopol, and that both must be taken before you could intercept the food of the Russian army and take Sevastopol. As to the interception of supplies into the Crimea across the steppes beyond Perekop, he was told by a gentleman that every Spring [?],000 carts were obtained to go from Odessa and other places on the coast, over the steppes, with produce to the Crimea, and that all that commerce was now suspended. The consequence was that the Russian Government would avail itself of all that means of conveyance; while so far from the steppes being an obstacle, journeys were made over steppes five or six times greater in extent than those. Was it not better that we should look at all these things in this light and calmly consider them without giving way to an effervescence of feeling which prevented our judging of the consequences of what we were about to do? We had recommenced the war with determination to take Sevastopol. When he said that the united strength of England and France could not be resisted by any human power he made one exception in favor of a greater power than either. He alluded to pestilence and disease. He had read lately some extracts from Spencer’s work with reference to the climate of the Crimea, which had reference to the Summer. He never dreamed of applying those observations to the Winter, for if well housed and fed and not overworked in the trenches, there was nothing in the constitution of an Englishman to prevent his living and being in health in the Winter in the Crimea. But in the Summer, according to the best authorities, it was hardly possible for an Englishman in the Crimea, unless the most careful precaution was observed, to escape the intermittent fever which prevailed in July, August and half of September. Those were the fatal months. If any one sinned against the most careful rules of diet; if a man went out in the mid-day sun or was exposed to the night dews; if he took cold water when heated or ate new corn or fruit—all these things brought on the intermittent fever, and all these precautions soldiers, of all other men, disregarded. He dreaded the fate of the army in July, August and September.
We have no desire to give to the observations of an advocate pleading a cause—even if it be the cause of Peace—a weight which ought not to belong to them; but common sense seems to accord with most of what Mr. Cobden here advances. It is not to be supposed that Russia would leave the main channel for supplies to her Crimean Army without defense. She has made blunders enough in the conduct of the war, as even her special advocates will not deny; but nothing to lead us to suppose her Government capable of such fatuity as this. If Kertch, or Arabat, or Genitchi were necessary to her as depots of provisions, she would have had them fortified and defended by troops, especially as she must long ago have expected a naval attack on those places—whereas the allied Commanders found neither forts nor soldiers in their way. Mr. Cobden is undoubtedly right in saying that Perekop is the great channel for her supplies.
There can be no doubt that if men and munitions enough are sent to the Crimea by the Allies they can conquer and hold that peninsula. So far, however, they seem to have added only Omer Pasha’s 35,000 men, the Piedmontese 15,000 and 25,000 of the French reserves in Turkey, or in all 75,000 men to their armies since the beginning of the second campaign. Their entire efficient force now in the Crimea cannot be reckoned at above 175,000 men. These troops are however weakened by being scattered, 35,000 at Eupatoria, and 20,000 at Kertch, leaving 120,000 before Sevastopol. Of these 45,000 would be required to keep up the siege, which leaves 75,000 for field operations. Now this army is not strong enough for the peculiar movements it must undertake in order to turn the enemy’s intrenchments, since the Russians can oppose it with a stronger force in a more advantageous position. We say stronger, because 18,000 new troops have just entered the Peninsula. Under these circumstances it is barely possible that the allied Generals may attempt the assault, notwithstanding the fearful slaughter it involves. But we shall believe this only when we hear that it has been done.