Published unsigned in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4568, December 10, 1855, pp. 5-6; attributed to Friedrich Engels by MEGA² (I/14). Text from the original newspaper (Library of Congress, Chronicling America). Traducción al español.
We have at last received a complete collection of documents upon the battle of Kars. On the Turkish side we have, beside Gen. Williams’s report, the letters of several newspaper correspondents at either Kars or Erzeroum, but what they add to the official account is of so confused and contradictory nature that it must count for next to nothing. The Russian side is represented by a few letters from officers more intent on describing the obstinate character of the fight than in giving accurate details of position, which those actually engaged must have very soon lost all faculty and opportunity of observing, and by General Muravieff’s report, filling thirteen columns in the Invalide Russe. This was rather difficult to procure in extenso, as neither the British nor the French press have deigned to give more than extracts from it; some German papers, however, have it in full, and thus we are able to compare the two official accounts with each other.
The total absence of accurate maps and plans of the ground renders it, of course, impossible to pass a decided opinion upon most of the tactical details of the engagement. There are wanting, besides, other details necessary to form a correct judgment upon many of its episodes. But what we have is sufficient to give a pretty clear idea of the scene and of the main features of the action; and, to the honor of the Turks be it said, their defense does not lose its glorious character under close examination.
The town of Kars is situated on the right, or south-eastern bank of the Kars-chai, in a bend of that river. To the south-east of it, on the same bank of the river, is a plain; but on the northern side (on the left bank) a range of hights approaches the river closely, and is continued on the other side of the ravine through which the river runs below the town, by another range, the Karadagh. These hights completely command the town, and from here the Russians, in 1828, pushed their trenches against it. But these same hights, too, form an admirable position for defense. Encircling the whole of the bend of the river before mentioned, they stretch out on the western side and above Kars, as far as another of its bends, by which a good portion of the southern front of defense becomes inaccessible. From this upper bend of the river begins the north-western front of defense, called by Gen. Williams the Tahmas-front. It is guarded by three large works called, from the bend upward, or from left to right: 1. Tahmas Tabia (redoubt). 2. Yaksh Tabia. 3. Rennison Lines. The former two are closed redoubts, the third is a large irregular work, open at the gorge. All these works flank each other and are more or less connected by detached parapets thrown up further back in the intervals. They are fully 2½ miles from Kars. Next to the Rennison Lines comes the largest and most important work on this side, Fort Lake, a sort of citadel, erected on the most commanding point of the whole range, and capable of holding several battalions. From Fort Lake to where, lower down, the river breaks through the range of hills, runs the north-eastern front of defense; here four small lunettes, open at the gorge, had been constructed, and were called the English works (Ingliz Tabias). They, too, had lines of parapets behind their intervals. Gen. Williams, finding that these constructions were on too small a scale to offer serious resistance, caused a closed work of larger dimensions to be thrown up in their rear, which was called Williams’s Tabia. On the other side of the river, on the nearest point of the Karadagh, were built two works, Arab and Karadagh Tabias, either of which could take in flank an assault on the nearest of the English works. Finally, on the south-eastern side of the town, the plain was closed by a triple range of intrenchments the most important of which were Hafiz Pasha Tabia on the eastern or left, and Kanly Tabia on the western or right flank; the latter near the point where the line again joins the river above Kars. Thus, the whole line of defense was divided by the river into two great divisions, from Tahmas to the English works on the left, from Karadagh to Kanly Tabia on the right bank.
After menacing this south-eastern front for some time, the Russians had gone south-west toward the village of Kanly, where they encamped. Toward the middle of September they prepared for passing with the main body to the left bank of the river, and attacking the north-western or Tahmas front with the 18th and 21st divisions of infantry, while the 13th division was concentrated at the village of Chakmak, north-east of the town, for the attack of the English front. Thus, the whole of the lines west of the river were to be assailed at once.
To judge from the state of the ground, this portion of the lines was naturally by far the strongest, but its artificial defenses appear to have been rather neglected in the beginning. It seems that Gen. Williams for a long while thought Fort Lake sufficient to cover the town on this side, although the artillery of that work could not be expected to command a range of hills extending three miles to the right and as much to the left. He admits himself that the three works of the Tahmas front with their connecting breastworks, were only constructed when the movement of the Russians toward Kanly took place, viz: in July. These works at first were mere lunettes open at the gorge, but the Russians delaying their attack, the Tasmah and Yuksh works were changed into closed redoubts. As to the time the English Tabias were constructed, Gen. Williams does not give us any information; but he gives us distinctly to understand that the only really important work of that group the Williams Tabia, serving as a citadel and reduit to the four outlying lunettes, was thrown up but a few days before the actual attack. It appears, besides, from his report that many works of lesser extent were constructed during the last days wherever they might seem likely to strengthen a weak portion of the line. Thus, it cannot be said that Williams and his engineer, Lieut. Col. Lake, were in a hurry to complete the defenses of the town, and considering the narrow escape they have had even now, we can scarcely doubt that the Russians would have taken Kars, had they not idled away four months, or had they even assaulted it in August or the first days of September with the same forces they had on the 29th of September.
That the intrenchments were not devised and constructed upon one single fixed plan, is clear from what we have just now stated. What unity can there be in a system of intrenchments to which, day after day, new works are added, the necessity of which was not acknowledged the day before? The descriptions we read show us indeed as incongruous an accumulation of field-works as one can possibly imagine. The defenses of most important points is at first neglected, then by and by overdone; batteries, redans, lunettes, redoubts, epaulements, are thrown up right and left, on the periphery of a circle measuring some ten miles round. Lake, the engineer, was sure to find no end of fresh sites for new works, and Williams, the artilleryman, appears to have been just the man to construct batteries wherever a gun might enfilade any possible approach of the enemy. The number of troops disposable for the defense of these complicated and extensive works does not seem to have ever entered into their calculations; and when the day of the action came, Gen Williams had, as a matter of course, to confess that his lines were “undermanned.” If he had not forgotten his quality of chief of the staff and virtual commander-in-chief in his other quality of artillerist, he would not have had to complain of this circumstance.
The system of fieldworks which formed the main line of defense appears to have been that of lunettes or redoubts, behind the intervals of which epaulments for infantry, and in some places for artillery, too, formed a sort of curtains, so as to establish a species of loosely connected, bastioned fronts, with openings large enough to admit of columns sallying forth from the lines to attack the enemy at a favorable moment. This rather old-fashioned method would not enter into the head of any engineer who had to construct an intrenched camp for a European army; redoubts, closed at the gorge, would be considered sufficient, and epaulments would be thrown up for no other purpose than to shelter the reserves from artillery fire. But here these epaulements were to be defended as part and parcel of the system; their fire in fact had to support the redoubts. The consequence was a great squandering of combatants in the beginning of the action, which must have contributed its part to the “undermanning” of the whole of the lines, and which must have weakened the reserves to a considerable degree. But Gen. Williams had a very good reason for adopting this unusual method at Kars. He had a good many Lazian and Kurdish mountaineers, Bashi-Bazouks, beside about one thousand volunteers from the town—all troops completely useless in the open field, and not reliable enough to be trusted with the defense even of an important intrenched post; but for a tenacious defense of parapets, they were very useful, particularly if those parapets were not directly exposed to the first onset of the enemy. Consequently, it was for these irregulars that Williams threw up his long lines; and in this case we believe he was perfectly right, though he might evidently have managed a great deal better in the laying out of these works. What we consider, however, unpardonable is the throwing up of so many small redans or flèches in front of his redoubts, by which he was obliged still more to weaken his really disposable reserve force. He appears to feel his mistake, for he says as little about them as he possibly can, and if it were not for the Russian report, we should to this day be ignorant even of the existence of these flèches in front of the Tasmah redoubts, which the Russians took on the first onset.
On the 29th Sept., before daybreak, Muravieff launched four columns against the Tasmah front. General Maidel, with the 21st division, attacked the Tasmah redoubt with one column, while the other attempted to pass between that work and the river flowing to its left, (Russian right). At the same time General Kovalevski, with the 18th division, attacked Yuksh Tabia with one column, and the Rennison lines with another. The Russians are acknowledged on all hands to have advanced with the greatest steadiness and bravery. They penetrated without difficulty into the outlying flèches of the Turks, and attempted the salient angles of the redoubts. But here they met with a desperate resistance. General Kmety, (Ismail Pasha,) commanding the Tahmas front, had taken his measures so well, and inspired his soldiers with such confidence—he was in the Yuksh redoubt himself—that whenever the head of a Russian column had penetrated into the ditches, or even the works themselves, it was immediately cut up. Each of the Russian columns advanced in three successive bodies; the second or main body was to secure the advantages gained by its advanced guard, while the third or reserve was to bring the final decision, and to guard against any unforeseen accidents. But when the main body arrived, the advanced guard was generally in disorder, and this disorder was soon communicated to all the fresh troops coming up. At the Rennison lines, the Russians had to run the gauntlet of the cross-fire of Fort Lake to the right, and of a couple of batteries to the left rear of the Rennison lines, beside being crushed by the telling front fire of a battalion of rifles in the works before them. Here General Kovalevski, all his staff, and most of the chiefs of regiments and battalions, fell, and the column was broken before it reached the ditch of the work.
The attack degenerated, as usual, into a desultory fusilade and cannonade, during which the Russian commanders sought to restore order and to attempt fresh manuevers. But too many troops had been engaged at once by them. To bring them into fire was easy enough, to withdraw or even control them was more than could be done. Indeed this obstinate firing, interrupted now and then by weak attempts at a renewed charge, filled up the long space of six hours succeeding to the first hour of actual decisive fighting, and this explains the tremendous disproportion between the losses of the Turks who fought under cover and of the Russians who exposed themselves recklessly to the enemy’s shots.
In the midst of this struggle the extreme right column of the Russians appears to the rear of Tahmas Tabia on the plateau. It has brought a battery along with it, which opens on Tahmas Tabia, enfilading two of its faces and taking in rear the third. The moment is decisive. If that column gains ground, the epaulements, attacked in the rear, must be abandoned, the redoubts exposed to fire from all sides must soon fall. But help is at hand. Three battalions, two from the general reserve and one from Fort Lake, arrive at the same time; the road being along the hill-side toward the river, hides them from the sight of the Russians until they are well on their flank; a rush and the enemy is routed.
That was the second decisive moment, and nobody was more eager to seize it than Gen. Kmety. With true military instinct he rushed at the head of his men out of Yuksh Tabia on the battalions directly opposed to him; the garrisons of the adjoining redoubts follow his example, and the two whole Russian divisions, already broken by repeated repulses and heavy fire, are driven headlong down the hill by a few Turkish battalions. That was the master-stroke of the battle, and its honor is exclusively due to Kmety. After that there was no more serious fighting on that side of Kars: the firing went on for some time longer, but the battle was over to all intents and purposes.
At the same time Gen. Bazin had attacked, from Chakmak, the north-eastern front, the English Tabias, with the greater part of the thirteenth division. His troops found these little flèches garrisoned by a few companies of irregulars only, and took possession of them at the first onset. The irregulars, reënforced by those from behind the connecting epaulements and by a number of townspeople, fell into a similar desultory fusilade as the Russians did on the Tahmas front; but the commanders succeeded in throwing the greater part of them into Fort Williams, where they could offer a more effective resistance, while the guns of Fort Lake from the left, and Arab Tabia and Karadagh Tabia from the right, poured shot and canister among the Russians. Next arrived two batallions from Karadagh, which took the lead in a fresh charge against the Russians. They were driven out of the small English Tabias, all of which, open to the rear, were unfit for defense in that direction; and herewith the battle ended on that side also.
The way in which General Williams directed the defense deserves all praise. He had certainly not 20,000 men in Kars, all included; he was obliged to guard the southern front with a certain number of troops, and he was attacked by more than 30,000 Russians. Yet in the most decisive moment the advance of but five battalions of reserves was sufficient to restore the superiority to his troops on the whole field of battle. But the hero of the day was certainly Kmety. He not only had to make the immediate tactical arrangements on the heavily attacked front—and they were very good—but also to decide the action by seizing the proper moment for a blow in return. We have seen how well he knew to seize the moment. The Russians had still a numerous body in reserve; Muravieff had sent General Brummer with a portion of it to the battle-field to renew, if there was a chance, the assault, or else to draw off the troops engaged if there was none. When Brummer arrived he found the Russian columns flying down hill in disorder before Kmety’s vigorous charge; but for that circumstance he very likely would have attempted a fresh attack, which might have had at least some partial results. The Turks had no reserves left in spite of the desperate bravery which animated them, another attack by fresh troops might have driven them out of the three redoubts of the Tahmas front, and from that position the Russians could have shelled the town and the Turkish magazines. It was Kmety alone whose well-timed offensive movement at once cut off all chance for such an attempt; accordingly, Brummer drew off the troops engaged and abandoned the field. That Kmety could undertake such a movement with troops who had stood five or six hours fighting against superior numbers, is more than anybody would have expected from the army-corps of Arabistan, from which these troops were taken; for the Turkish defense of fortified lines was hitherto known for its almost exclusively defensive character only.
The Russian attack was intended for a surprise, and in consequence was undertaken with large masses at once; but as the surprise failed completely, the assailants found themselves under the disadvantage of having too many of their troops engaged at once on ground offering little or no shelter. The Turkish fire thinned their ranks most effectively; and, as usual in such cases, that desultory firing was resorted to by their troops which always follows repulsed charges, and which renders it all but impossible to re-form the men for a fresh assault. At the same time, it would appear that the second and third detachments of the Russian columns on the Tahmas front were far too soon, and, with no definite object, entangled into the disorderly fusilade: so that after the first assault, no second general attack could be organized. The unfitness of the Russians for light-infantry service is here again manifest. In every other army, after the first repulse was once rendered irreparable, a line of skirmishers would have been thrown out against the enemy’s works, under shelter of which the remaining troops would have re-formed; but here the Russian columns, turned into disorderly heaps of men clubbing tenaciously together, unwilling to retreat, yet unfit for movements in advance, appear to have remained patiently within close range of the Turks, allowing themselves to be shot down by wholesale. Thus alone can the enormous loss of the Russians be explained. It was just as at Inkermann and the Chernaya; bravery enough, but of the stupidest sort known to history.
Muravieff appears to have lost his senses entirely, indeed he is said to have subsequently gone crazy. Either he should have brought up his reserves sooner and renewed the assault with them, or else he should have broken off the fight after the second hour, on the Tahmas side at least. As it is, he showed himself to be the worthy counterpart of his colleagues in the Crimea, who are distinguished for nothing so much as for the reckless obstinacy with which they sacrifice their soldiers.