Published without signature as a leading article in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4578, December 21, 1855, p. 4; attributed to Friedrich Engels by MEGA² (I/14); dated December 6, 1855, by MEGA². Text after the original print of the newspaper (Library of Congress, Chronicling America). Traducción al español

The diplomatic saloons and the stock exchanges of Europe are again, as in the beginning of last Winter, occupied with rumors of peace. Sweden has joined the Western Alliance, Austria has prepared an ultimatum satisfactory to the Allies, Prussia is earnestly bestirring herself in the peace making business, Louis Bonaparte is quite willing to conclude a treaty on reasonable terms, the old Four Points of Vienna are dug out of their graves again, and the funds everywhere take on an upward tendency. Everybody seems agreed with everybody, and it would all be very well had not the principal party—Russia—been left entirely out of the question. Now, whatever may be the internal condition of Russia, and supposing even that all the tales of the European Press about the prostration, the exhausted resources, the distress and discontent among all classes of the population of Russia be correct, we must certainly admit that she shows no sign of an inclination to give in. The orders of the day of the Emperor during his recent tour are now published, and from the facts they indicate, as well as those given in the journal of his voyage and other sources of information, we must conclude that Russia is preparing, not for peace, but for a new campaign on the very grandest scale.

And indeed it cannot be denied that the military position held by the Russians is by far more favorable than they had a right to expect after their repeated disasters. In Asia, they maintain the blockade of Kars in spite of their recent severe defeat, and all the Turkish troops in Asia Minor are not sufficient to drive them back. Nay, they even carry out, unresisted, offensive movements in the valley of the Murad Chai (S. E. Euphratis), menacing the upper valleys of the Kars Chai, the Aras (Araxes), and the Frat (N. W. Euphratis). Omer Pasha has indeed invaded Mingrelia, but the success of his further movements is now seen to be, at the least, very doubtful, even though Muravieff should remain where he is. In the Caucasus, there has not been, up to the present time, any serious insurrection of the mountain tribes, much less a general one, and it would seem they are even more tranquil than before the war broke out. In the Crimea, there can now be scarcely any doubt that they intend holding their ground, that is, the whole of the Peninsula with the exception of a few square miles; and if they intend, by this time, to hold it during the Winter, they must have found a means to arrange the greatest difficulty—the supply of provisions. For that their position, in a merely tactical and strategical sense, is fully tenable there can be no doubt; the allied Generals have left them the time to fortify the accessible points and to march up their reënforcements. We do not at present propose to inquire how much of all this is due to the skill of the Russians and how much to the neglect, timidity and errors of the allied Generals; but the fact is that the Russians, after the loss of the Sea of Azoff, the interruption of their communication by the spit of Arabat, the defeat of the Chernaya, and the storming of South Sevastopol, still believe themselves in a position to hold the Crimea during the Winter. And not only that —there are very strong indications of an attack being prepared on Kertch and Yenikale as soon as the frost shall have driven the allied vessels from the Sea of Azoff and the Straits. Thus, the actual ground lost by the Russians during two campaigns amounts to this: the Dobrodja, the Circassian coast, South Sevastopol, Eupatoria and Kertch; while the concentrated efforts of the Allies have been unable thus far to drive them out of Asiatic Turkey, or to wrench the Crimea from their grasp.

True, all these are negative results, and what sacrifices Russia has had to suffer in order to secure even these! Out of 29½ divisions of infantry at the disposal of Russia 19½ have been actively engaged—some for three, most for two campaigns, and but a small portion for one campaign only. All of these 19½ divisions have suffered severely, so much so that in many the third and fourth battalions have been or are being merged in the first and second; and this in spite of constant arrivals of fresh recruits. Of the remaining ten divisions, not one can for the moment be spared. Myriads of men have been lost during the long forced marches, especially in Winter. The reserve brigades are either incorporated with the line or disposed of as separate bodies. Even the regimental depots have had to march levies four times as heavy as in time of peace—repeated now for three consecutive years—and yet have not been able to keep up the ranks of the army. The militia, recruited by another levy requiring at once as many men as the regular army in eight years of peace, is now being incorporated with the line. A fresh levy, going on at this moment, calls out four times the number wanted in ordinary circumstances. All this is true enough. It is even true that, with the exception of the ten untouched divisions and about the same number of reserve brigades, the regular Russian army, as it existed before the war, belongs to bygone things. The same regiments are there, and with cadres pretty well filled after the incorporation of the militia, but they are no longer the same soldiers. The vast majority are raw, badly drilled recruits, and the Russian is a slow hand at learning the soldier's trade. We repeat it, all this is perfectly true; but with such tremendous efforts, there cannot be the slightest doubt that the number of armed men now in the pay of Russia must exceed whatever she may have kept up at any previous period. The very fear of the allied Generals—absurd as it is—of being attacked on the Chernaya, proves it; the results of all the reconnoissances from Eupatoria or Kertch prove that at a short distance from these places the Russians were always in a position to draw up superior forces. Whatever exaggeration there may be in the orders of the day of the Emperor Alexander, (and these cannot be so very great, as such appeals are intended to act as much upon the army itself as upon Europe,) it still remains true that the Crimean army is strong enough to resist any attack upon its main positions; that it is fully prepared to Winter in the Crimea; that during October and November an uninterrupted tide of reënforcements has flowed toward Perekop, partly to strengthen the Crimean army, and partly to form, as it were, an army of reserve, intrusted at the same time with the defense of Nikolaieff and Cherson; that, unlike last Autumn, the necessary concentrations of troops have taken place before the bad season set in; that therefore, the disastrous marches across the snow-clad steppe need not be repeated; and that, finally, the Russians can open the next campaign with a marked superiority, unless they suffer extraordinary misfortunes, (such as the British last Winter,) or unless the Allies display the greatest activity in bringing up fresh troops before Spring.