The War News (1855)

Published without signature as a leading article in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4540, November 7, 1855, p. 4; attributed to Friedrich Engels by MEGA² (I/14). Text after the original print of the newspaper (Library of Congress, Chronicling America). Traducción al español

The war news brought by the Arago, namely the taking of Kinburn by the Allies, is the most important forward step they have made since the fall of the south side of Sevastopol. It gives them an unassailable position on the peninsula between the Dnieper and the Crimea; a position commanding the entrance of the Liman (estuary) of that river and menacing at the same time the communications between Perekop and Cherson. There is a rumor mentioned in the Vienna papers that the Allies had landed thirty thousand men on the spit of Tendra, a long, narrow island stretching within a few miles distance along the southern shore of the peninsula of Kinburn. If the fact of the landing be true, the numbers are evidently exaggerated. But if even a small body only of the allied troops' had occupied this spit, it would show their intention of establishing themselves on the peninsula, and of seriously menacing the Russian lines of communications. They might from this position prove as troublesome to Russian convoys as the corps of Gens. D'Allonville and Paget, from Eupatoria, might to the convoys coming down from Perekop to Sympheropol. They might even, by rapidly concentrating a strong force on this peninsula, make a dash at Cherson, and burn everything with the exception of the small citadel—unless, indeed, the Russians have fortified that town too and can spare a strong garrison to defend it. Anyhow, Kinburn and the long, flat sandy islands along the shore of the gulf leading to Perekop, form a series of positions which the Allies can easily hold by small bodies of troops, and each of which they can turn at any moment into a base for ulterior and rapid operations. The Russians may thus, by a few battalions, be obliged to disseminate a great number of their troops in order to secure most important points from sudden irruptions; and so long as the allied fleets hold command of the sea, these newly gained possessions cannot be attacked by any Russian land force.

The few details yet known respecting the taking of Kinburn confirm the experience of former episodes in this war, while they again tend to prove the intentional incorrectness of the Russian charts. On all the best charts there is no water of sufficient depth for ships-of-the-line or heavy frigates to be found anywhere within some miles of Kinburn. Yet when the allied fleets sent out gunboats to take soundings within easy range of Kinburn, they found fully four and a half fathoms at sixteen hundred yards from the walls—at least, so it appears, on the north side within the Liman. Nine heavy steam-frigates could approach to that distance and shell the place; and while the mortar-boats did the same from far nearer stations, the gun-boats enfiladed the faces of the bastions, and the floating batteries—which must have approached to some six hundred or seven hundred yards, if not closer—succeeded in laying several breaches in the sea-walls.

What the precise nature of the defenses of Kinburn was, we cannot as yet make out very distinctly. The small town stretching right across the narrow spit was defended by a sort of continuous rampart of masonry, something like a bastioned pentagon or square, with guns firing en barbette, or through masonry embrasures. The guns for the most part stood uncovered, but on the points where their fire was to act with the greatest force there were two tiers, the lower one casemated, the upper one firing through masonry embrasures in a wall erected on the flat roof of the casemates. As at Bomarsund, the masonry, as soon as it was acted upon by a vastly superior fire from the ships, crumbled away, and three breaches, it appears, were formed by the floating batteries in six to eight hours. This is explained by the very small number of guns in the fortress, of which there were only seventy; and, as the attack could be expected from any side, every front of the fortress had to be armed, so that against the main attack no more than from sixteen to twenty guns could be brought to bear. That their fire must have soon been silenced by the vertical fire of the mortar-boats, the enfilading shots of the gun-boats, the shell-storm of the steam-frigates, and the breaching front fire of the floating batteries, bringing into action at least eight to tenfold the number of guns, is not to be wondered at. And as the day was exceedingly calm, the fire from the floating batteries was as steady as it would have been from any shore battery; it therefore could really act as breaching fire. These unwieldy, floating masses helpless and useless as soon as the least amount of swell destroys their steadiness, must necessarily be able to do great execution in perfectly calm weather, and in situations where the large vessels can approach within range, and thereby draw upon themselves the principal fire of the enemy. Such favorable circumstances, however, occur but seldom; and where fortresses like Cronstadt, Sweaborg, or the sea-forts of Sevastopol, were the object of their attack, the floating batteries would prove more cumbersome than useful. Thus on the whole, the affair at Kinburn cannot be said to have proved anything in favor of these clumsy sea-monsters.

The allied troops who landed to the south-east of Kinburn must have amounted to a couple of thousand: for of the English alone there were six battalions on board the fleet numbering, with artillery, nearly four thousand men, of which but a portion, however, was landed; while the French had another brigade, on board their ships. The part taken by the troops in this action was very inconsiderable; they sent skirmishers and field guns against the place, but as there was a broad wet ditch in front of it, the Russians appear to have treated this impotent demonstration with sovereign contempt, and not even opened a heavy fire on them, for we do not hear that the allied troops lost anything to speak of. It was the overwhelming fire of the fleets alone which forced the place to surrender, and as soon as the guns of the place had been silenced, the fleets offered a capitulation, which was accepted. The garrison marched out with the honors of war and surrendered themselves prisoners. Then it was found that the whole force in the fortress consisted of thirteen hundred or fourteen hundred men; and this at once proves what sort of a fortress Kinburn was. In bastioned fortresses, especially small ones, it is generally considered that one weak battalion, or from five hundred to six hundred men, is required for every bastion; a bastioned square, the smallest fortification possible in the bastioned system, requiring from two thousand to two thousand five hundred men for its defense. Here a little over one-half of that number only were present, and yet they had to defend not only plain ramparts, but also to save the guns in the casemates. Thus, either the fortifications, then, must have been very insignificant indeed, or else very weakly defended; and in either case, the success of the allied fleets before Kinburn does not in any way affect the generally adopted opinion that one gun ashore, well sheltered behind earth ramparts, is worth more than six on board ship coming to attack it.

The entrance to the Liman of the Dnieper once having been forced by the Allies, and the pretended existence of a bar of great shallowness at that point having been proved to be a mere Russian stratagem, the whole Liman is opened to the action of the French and English fleets. The interior of the Liman is known to have a great depth of water, at least in the central channel, though nearer to the shores it abounds in sand-banks, none of which, however, are formidable to gun-boats and other light vessels. Thus Otshakoff, Glubakoye and other points on the shores of the estuary are exposed to the attacks of the Allies and very likely will have to suffer from them.

That the entrance to the Liman is not the shallow channel indicated on the charts, the allied admirals might have inferred from the history of the campaign of 1788. And here we may be allowed to refer again to that campaign, not only because it gives us a clear insight into what the nature of this estuary is with reference to naval warfare, but also because it was then the scene of some of the exploits of our Revolutionary hero, Paul Jones.

At that time, Kinburn and the south shore were held by the Russians, and Otshakoff and the north shore, by the Turks. The Russians had a fleet at Glubakoye, between the mouths of the Dnieper and of the Bug; its sailing vessels of deep draught were commanded by Rear-Admiral Paul Jones, and consisted of five ships of the line of eighty guns, and eight frigates, while the rowing flotilla of sixty-five light vessels was under the orders of the Prince of Nassau-Siegen. The Turks had about Otshakoff, under Hassan Pasha, ten ships of the line, six frigates and fifty-three vessels of light draught. A second Turkish fleet of eight sail of the line, eight frigates, and twenty-four smaller sail was cruising in the offing. After a few preliminary engagements, Hassan-Pasha, on the 27th of June, entered the Liman with the whole of his first fleet, sailed up as far as Glubakoye, (thus proving that ships of the line, with their full armament on board, could come up so far,) and formed in order of battle, the large vessels in the first line. The Russians, on the contrary, covered their liners and frigates by the row-boats. On the morning of the 28th the battle began. The Turkish line advanced, and soon came up within range of the Russian liners. Within an hour a Turkish ship of seventy guns was aground; the admiral's flag-ship, carrying eighty guns, was ashore a few moments after. Two frigates of forty guns went to succor them, but one of them struck on a shoal almost immediately; while Paul Jones's large vessels kept the remainder of the Turkish vessels engaged, the row-boats closed up with the stranded vessels, boarded and set fire to them. The remainder of the Turkish fleet soon retired in no enviable state; but still their large ships made such a bold front that their retreat was pretty unmolested by the Russian gun-boats and galleys.

But the measure of their disaster was not yet filled. Hassan-Pasha, having collected the remains of his fleet at Otshakoff, resolved to join the fleet cruising in the Black sea, and to effect this, he had to pass round the point of the Kinburn spit. Here Suvoroff, who commanded in the peninsula, had constructed a masked battery of twenty-four guns; and when the Turks, in the night of the 30th of June, 1788, attempted to double that cape, the battery opened upon them with great effect. Before daybreak, the fire of the Russians, favored by a bright moonlight, had brought into great distress the Turkish fleet, whose ships had to pass one after the other through the narrow channel, and were all the while within easy range of the battery. Several vessels got ashore, others showed signals of distress, some went down or were in flames, and as day broke the Russian fleet bore down upon them. Paul Jones very wisely kept his large ships back, as there was no room for them to maneuver; and indeed the liner Vladimir, venturing too much forward, was lost on a shoal. But the rowing flotilla closed with the Turks, and destroyed a great many of their ships, so that before noon the whole action was at an end. Three sail of the line, five frigates, and seventeen smaller sail were destroyed; and one liner and two frigates were taken by the Russians. Of the two sail of the line which were saved by the Turks, one went down before it could reach Constantinople, and a frigate sank as soon as she had reached the island of Peresan. A portion of the Turkish fleet sought shelter under the guns of Otshakoff, but even here Prince Nassau-Siegen attacked and destroyed them on the 1st and 2d August.

This campaign shows clearly what sort of a naval battle-field the Dnieper Liman is. The smaller sort of ships of the line, or at least the large fifty and sixty gun frigates, can enter it; but whether they will be able to maneuver in it with any degree of safety, though they be propelled by steam, remains doubtful. But that corvettes, sloops and vessels of lighter draught, especially steamers, can easily maneuver in these waters, while the larger vessels may serve, when once moored, as stationary batteries, there is not the slightest doubt whatever. And with the means of naval warfare now in the possession of the Allies, with due activity they should be able to scour the Liman from Otschakoff to the mouth of the Dnieper and the Bug.