The War in Asia (December 6, 1855) (1855)

Published without signature as a leading article in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4582, December 26, 1855, pp. 4-5; attributed to Friedrich Engels by MEGA² (I/14); dated December 6, 1855, by MEGA². Text after the original print of the newspaper (Library of Congress, Chronicling America). Traducción al español

While the campaign in the Crimea may be regarded as ended, and new developments of importance are not to be expected, in Asia the struggle still remains in uncertainty, which may not be entirely cleared up, at least for us on this side of the ocean, for some time to come. As a means of shedding light upon the subject, and of enabling our readers the better to appreciate the facts when they become known, we will now lay before them the most accurate information within our command as to the relative strength of the parties at the immediate seat of war.

The Russian army of the Caucasus, including Georgia and Erivan, is composed in time of peace of three divisions of infantry, or six brigades, containing twelve regiments—which in turn include forty-eight active service battalions, with one Grenadier reserve brigade, consisting of three battalions of Grenadiers and three of carbineers and one battalion of rifles—in all, fifty-five battalions. Every one of these regiments has also two reserve battalions, making with eight battalions of combined reserves, thirty-six battalions. Then there are forty-seven battalions of the Caucasian line, and a militia force occupying in common with the regular line troops the lines of forts north and south of the Caucasus and along the coasts of the Black and Caspian seas. The total infantry is thus seen to be 138 battalions. Of cavalry there is one regiment of dragoons, three Mussulman and two Kurdish regiments, and a variable number of Cossacks. Of artillery, there is one division of fourteen batteries, light, heavy, and mountain guns. Of all these troops, the three divisions of infantry (numbered in the official army lists as the 14th, 20th and 21st,) with their reserves, the dragoons and artillery, are mostly made up of Russians and Poles, while the line battalions and the Mussulmans and Kurdish horse are recruited from the natives. The depots of the infantry divisions were at Rostoff, on the Don, and therefore at a great distance from most of the stations. In consequence of this and of the climate the regiments were generally very weak, and the line and reserves can scarcely have averaged 500 men to the battalion, while those of the militia were scarcely any stronger. The whole force of this Caucasian army may be estimated at from 70,000 to 80,000 men. When the war broke out the 13th and 18th divisions of infantry, beside three regiments of dragoons, were sent to the Caucasus, increasing the total strength to 90,000 or 100,000 men. This force, however, had not only to guard the southern slope of the Caucasus, to hold Georgia and Mingrelia, and to meet the Turks in Armenia—it had, also, in conjunction with the Don and Black Sea Cossacks, to hold the line of the Kuban and Terek, as well as the advanced forts of the northern slope. To set them free, the Orenburg corps (23d division, counting eleven battalions) was sent to the Kuban and Terek, which line it now holds along with the Cossacks before mentioned. Thus the greater part, if not all, of these 170 battalions of infantry, four regiments dragoons and five regiments of native irregulars, beside Cossacks, have been moved to the south of the Caucasus.

What their present strength is we have but few data to estimate. The regular line and reserve infantry cannot have been properly reënforced by recruits, and must number considerably less than five hundred men to the battalion. The militia on the contrary may have been increased by recruits from the country itself, many of whom may also have found their way into the regular army. Thus the militia force must now be stronger in proportion to the line than some time ago, and it will be sufficiently exact if we put down the numerical strength of each, at a rough estimate, as follows:

These troops are distributed in the garrisons of Mingrelia, Akaltzik, Georgia and Erivan, and form beside, General Muravieff's active army. That General has before Kars and in the garrisons of Akhaltzikh and Jumri, the thirteenth, eighteenth and twenty-first divisions of infantry, three regiments of dragoons, three of Mussulmans, and some Cossacks. The Kurds deserted after the defeat of 29th September. According to our estimate this army should be from twenty to twenty-five thousand men strong, including all the troops of the military district of Akaltzsk, commanded until lately by General Kovalevski, killed before Kars.

The command of Erivan seems to comprise the grenadier brigade and the battalion of rifles, beside some militia. They fought last year at Bayazid, and now occupy the upper valley of the Murad Chai, and south-eastern Euphrates. The command of Mingrelia until lately comprised nothing but horse and foot militia, beside Cossacks under Gen. Bagration Mukhranski, but it has been reënforced of late by the 19th division of infantry, who were engaged, along with the militia, at the Ingour against Omer Pasha. The remainder of the troops, especially the 19th and 20th divisions of infantry, one regiment of dragoons, and the bulk of the reserve and militia, were stationed in Georgia, under Gen. Bebutoff, as a general reserve, ready to move wherever they might be required. At the news of Omer Pasha's landing at Sukum-Kaleh, Bebutoff moved to the front with the 19th division, and ordered the 20th division to follow as far as Kutais. No doubt he has taken proper steps to concentrate the disposable reserves and militia at convenient places. Now, supposing that the army under Muravieff and the Erivan corps amount to 25,000 men together—that the garrisons on the Turkish and Persian frontier amount to 15,000—that there must remain 15,000 men in Georgia to watch the hill tribes and to guard Tiflis—there would still remain a disposable force of 31,000 men under Prince Bebutoff, to meet the Turkish invasion, most of them old and tried troops of the line. This corps is fully equal, if not superior, to that which Omer Pasha can bring against it. In the beginning of November the Turkish commander had some 30,000 men, of which army two-thirds only are disposable at Ingour, the rest being required to guard depots and communications on the coast. In the way of reënforcements from Varna and Shumla, 10,000 men are all he could expect. Of this addition a considerable portion will be required to hold his line of communication as he advances inland, so that it is not to be expected that he will be able to outnumber Bebutoff at any given point. His immediate aim is evidently the conquest of Mingrelia, but with his present force he is likely to do this only in case of his being aided by a general rising of the mountaineers, or some other equally improbable event.