Published unsigned as a leading article, under the headline “The Treaty with Sweden”, in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4598, January 14, 1856, p. 4; probably by Karl Marx according to MEGA² (I/14), which lists it among the writings of doubtful authorship (Dubiosa). Text from the original newspaper (Library of Congress, Chronicling America). Traducción al español.
The European war has evolved another anomalous piece of treaty-making. Sardinia, siezed by England and France with diplomatic gentleness rivaling the gymnastics of the hog-killers in Cincinnati, of late so graphically described in our columns is first thrown into the boiling cauldron of war’s toil and trouble; and now, to continue the porcine metaphor, Sweden is caught by the hind-leg by the same political butchers. It is difficult, however, at this time, before we have the details and antecedents of the negotiation, to find out the real meaning of the treaty just made by the Allies and the latter Power. It is called a defensive treaty, but no statement of reasons for its adoption accompanies it, according to custom in such matters. We do not indeed call to mind any treaty patched up under similar circumstances. No encroachment whatever on the side of Russia is known to have incited it, or is at all mentioned. No complaint on the Swedish side has been made public. On the contrary, Sweden, or at least King Oscar, has uniformly declared that Russia has given him no cause to complain. This declaration is quite credible, for it would be madness for the Czar to deal otherwise than most tenderly with a neighbor, under such circumstances as the present.
By this treaty, neutrality is not altogether and openly abandoned, but Sweden puts herself under cover of the Allies, renouncing even her own decision and right of action. The principal point, however, relates to fisheries and pasturages, which henceforth Sweden is bound not to concede to Russia without French and English permission; and the same qualification extends to concessions of Swedish territory if required by Russia. It might be inferred from this that the Czar had made demands for such concessions; but this may be doubted, as his head and hands are full of other matters than those afforded by granite rocks in the polar region. The Emperor Nicholas may have wished to possess a station for the Russian military and commercial vessels in some of the harbors of Norway that do not freeze, in order thus to facilitate the communications between the harbors of the Baltic and the White Seas. Such a wish could only have been realized by friendly negotiation, and could not be pregnant with the danger of an invasion. As to the right of fishing along the shores, that question was settled in its most minute details forty-five years ago by the convention of Tornea concluded in 1810. This regulated the frontiers and the rights of subjects dwelling on sea-shores, islands, river-banks, and lands separating Sweden and Finland, which had been acquired by Russia through the Friedericksamm treaty of 1809, after a disastrous war to which Sweden was incited by England. If border warfare has taken place since that period, if pasturages have been invaded, it could only have been a family broil, as the Imperial Government does not possess any domains in that quarter. Along the banks of the River Tornea, north of the city of that name, dwell only Finnish populations, on the Swedish equally with the Russian side; and it is difficult to imagine that the encroachment on private lands by friendly and homogeneous inhabitants could menace the integrity of Sweden, or cause her to take refuge under the falcon wing of France and England.
As it stands now, this treaty is either an insult to Russia, or will soon be so considered. The secret article said to be annexed to it, is doubtless its principal feature. Its published articles seem rather to provoke a quarrel surreptitiously than to exhibit the manliness of doing it openly. If so, it is not a commendable thing. If Sweden desired to profit by the entanglements of Russia, and to recover her lost possessions, she should have joined the alliance and boldly declared war. However, if the war continues and Sweden takes part in it, she may recover her Finnish possessions; but should it be soon concluded, then this minatory treaty will probably rankle in the heart of the stronger Power, which seldom forgets or forgives injuries.
Moreover, the course formerly taken by Sweden at the instigation of England, proved fatal to the Vasas and to the country itself. In 1809 England allured Gustavus IV., by a subsidy of $7,000,000, to declare war against Russia. England then abandoned her ally, or at least did not succor her. Russia, then an ally of Napoleon, being provoked by the Anglo-Swedish alliance, invaded and conquered Finland, and Gustavus was obliged by the nation to descend from the throne, after which his old uncle Charles took the crown, and subsequently Bernadotte was elected King, and the Vasas became exiles. Not that under present circumstances we would forebode a like calamity for Sweden, but the actual war does not yet menace the fall of Russia, and such a neighbor can in the long run render Sweden very uncomfortable. Russia may now quietly swallow this treaty; but with her hereditary tenacity of purpose she may bide her time, and when Sweden has lost her present alliance, and France and England least think it likely, she may glut her revengeful stomach. For nearly a hundred and eighty years previous to the year 1294 the Russian people nourished their hatred against the Poles for their occupation of Moscow in 1612. Now Poland is nationally extinct.